On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.

On the sustainability of a monocentric city : lower transport costs from new transport facilities

This paper proposes a general equilibrium model of a monocentric city based on Fujita and Krugman (1995). Two rates of transport costs per distance and for the same good are introduced. The model assumes that lower transport costs are available at a few points on a line. These lower costs represent new transport facilities, such as high-speed motorways and railways. Findings is that new transport facilities connecting the city and hinterlands strengthen the lock-in effects, which describes whether a city remains where it is forever after being created. Furthermore, the effect intensifies with better agricultural technologies and a larger population in the economy. The relationship between indirect utility and population size has an inverted U-shape, even if new transport facilities are used. However, the population size that maximizes indirect utility is smaller than that found in Fujita and Krugman (1995).

Minority type matters : ethnic diversity and tolerance in 29 European democracies

Past research has shown that having a large population of ethnic minorities beyond the neighborhood level arouses intolerance in the majority. However, this paper presents the argument that the effect of minority size on tolerance depends on minority type: the less subject the minority is to negative stereotyping, the more favorable the effect that minority size has on tolerance. In this study, a hierarchical linear model was applied to a dataset on advanced and emerging democracies in Europe. The analysis shows that when the duration and level of democracy are controlled for, ethnic tolerance was associated positively with native minority size and negatively with foreign population size.

Shrinking population and the urban hierarchy

This paper examines whether population shrinkage leads to changes in urban hierarchy in terms of their relative size and function from the standpoint of the new economic geography. We find some salient patterns in which small cities in the agglomeration shadow become relatively bigger as medium industries spill over on them. This appears to be quite robust against a variation in the rate of natural change among cities. Thus, rank-size relationship and the urban hierarchy are partly disrupted as population shrinks. Regarding the welfare of the residents, a lower demand for land initially causes rent to go down, which boosts the utility. However, the illusion is short-lived because markets soon begin to shrink and suppress wages. We also find that it is better to maintain a slow pace of overall population decline in the long-term perspective. More importantly, it is crucial to sustain the relative livability of smaller cities to minimize the overall loss of utility.

Partition, independence, and population geography in Bengal

This study quantitatively explores the changing population geography in Bengal, with a particular focus on Partition in India in 1947 and Independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Based on decadal census data from 1901 to 2001 at the district level, this paper explores how trends in regional population growth evolved with such historical events. Following Redding and Sturm (2008), Differences-in-Differences estimation is also employed. Estimation results show that there were different shocks on both sides and from both events. In West Bengal, the change in the regional population trends occurred in 1947 and remained similar thereafter. On the other hand, in East Bengal, the population growth became statistically significant after 1971. Further robustness checks show that the impacts were not uniform with respect to the distance from the border. Overall analyses show that the emergence of the international border in Bengal had asymmetric impacts on both sides.