Political conditions for fair elections

Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

Trajectories and outcomes of the 'Arab Spring' : comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria

Almost three years have passed since the 'Arab Spring' began in late 2010. In the major sites of popular uprisings, political conditions remain unsettled or violent. Despite similarities in their original opposition to authoritarian rule, the outcomes differed from country to country. In Tunisia and Egypt, processes of transiting from authoritarian rule produced contrasting consequences for democratic politics. Uprisings led to armed rebellion in Libya and Syria, but whereas Gaddafi was overthrown, Asad was not. What explains the different trajectories and outcomes of the Arab Spring? How were these shaped by the power structure and levels of social control of the pre-uprising regimes and their state institutions, on the one hand, and by the character of the societies and oppositional forces that rose against them? Comparing Tunisia with Egypt, and Libya with Syria, this paper discusses various factors that account for variations in the trajectories and outcomes of the Arab Spring, namely, the legacy of the previous regime, institutional and constitutional choices during "transition" from authoritarian rule, socioeconomic conditions, and the presence of absence of ethnic, sectarian and geographic diversity.

Authoritarianism and labor market : preference of labor policies in the Arab Gulf countries

Migrant and labor issues are a primary concern in the Arab Gulf countries. With focus on the economic and political conditions that influence actors' decisions when framing labor policies, this study analyzes how preferences of such policies are formed and explains why the governments of the Arab Gulf countries attempt to implement less economical policies. The findings suggest that governments avoid concessions for enterprises required to implement more economical policies and chose uneconomical ones to maintain authoritarian regimes.

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.