The Evolution of the "One China" Concept in the Process of Taiwan's Democratization

This paper investigates how Taiwan's "one China" concept evolved during the democratization process that occurred under the leadership of former President Lee Teng-hui. The author argues that there was a crucial evolution of the "one China" concept and that the transformation of the concept resulted from changes in Taiwan's internal political circumstances. The evolution of the concept creates a real possibility that the "status quo" sought by the ROC in the Taiwan Strait both during and after the Cold War might be destroyed. In addition, any further evolution of the "one China" concept will surely make the "status quo" of Taiwan untenable, in that it would induce Taiwan to seek de jure instead of de facto independence, possibly initiating a conflict between the PRC and the ROC. To prevent such a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the international community must persuade the ROC not to go beyond the "status quo" and to stay within the framework of de facto independence. At the same time, both the PRC and the ROC should be urged to maintain an open conduit of communication for productive talks on the reunification of China.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55 and U.S.-R.O.C Relations

On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling Quemoy (Jinmen), one of the Kuomintang-held offshore islands, setting off the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. This paper focuses on the crisis and analyzes the following three questions: (1) What was the policy the U.S. took towards the Republic of China (R.O.C), especially towards the offshore islands, to try to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? (2) What were the intentions of the U.S. government in trying to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? And (3) how should U.S. policy towards the R.O.C. which led to solving the Taiwan Strait Crisis be positioned in the history of Sino-American relations? Through analysis of these questions, this study concludes that the position the U.S. took to bring an end to crisis, one which prevented China from “liberating Taiwan” and the Kuomintang from “attacking the mainland,” brought about the existence of a de facto “two-China” situation.