A Mathematical Representation of "Excitement" in Games from the Viewpoint of a Neutral Audience

Researchers have long believed the concept of "excitement" in games to be subjective and difficult to measure. This paper presents the development of a mathematically computable index that measures this concept from the viewpoint of an audience. One of the key aspects of the index is the differential of the probability of "winning" before and after one specific "play" in a given game. If the probability of winning becomes very positive or negative by that play, then the audience will feel the game to be "exciting." The index makes a large contribution to the study of games and enables researchers to compare and analyze the "excitement" of various games. It may be applied to many fields especially the area of welfare economics, ranging from allocative efficiency to axioms of justice and equity.

A Mathematical Representation of "Excitement" in Games: A Contribution to the Theory of Game Systems

Researchers have long believed the concept of "excitement" in games to be subjective and difficult to measure. This paper presents the development of a mathematically computable index that measures the concept from the viewpoint of an audience and from that of a player. One of the key aspects of the index is the differential of the probability of "winning" before and after one specific "play" in a given game. The index makes a large contribution to the study of games and enables researchers to compare and analyze the “excitement” of various games. It may be applied in many fields, especially the area of welfare economics, and applications may range from those related to allocative efficiency to axioms of justice and equity.

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.