The Political Economy of Growth: A Review

This cursory literature review discusses the direct and indirect effects of institutions, governance, and democracy on economic growth, and the following conclusions are drawn. First, institutions and governance have a positive effect on growth. Even reforms that are less than comprehensive can stimulate, though not sustain, growth. Second, democracy neither promotes nor hampers growth directly. It secures stability and resilience in growth. It also exerts impacts on sources of growth but its net effect remains inconclusive. There remains unanswered the question of why institutions and governance matter but not democracy does not. The difference may be partly due to negative effects on investment and labor supply as well as the low credibility of young or partial democracies.

Value Chain Dynamics and Growth of Local Firms:The Case of Motorcycle Industry in Vietnam

Vietnam’s burgeoning market for motorcycles has attracted global industry eaders,players from developing countries, and local firms. This has led to a dynamic evolution of value chains. This paper presents an explanation of the varieties of the growth patterns xperienced by the local suppliers, focusing on the roles of customer and local supplier strategies. Case studies showed that while the role of customers may be important, strategies of suppliers to improve the ompetitive edge in the production of otorcycle components and to diversify into other products account for important ariations of growth trajectories among local suppliers. Findings presented in this paper suggest the need to direct more attention to strategy that local firms use to boost their competitive edge in business.

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.

Performance of financial institutions in Bhutan

The Kingdom of Bhutan is a small landlocked country in South Asia, located in the eastern Himalayas, and bordered by India and China. Bhutan is a small and fragile economy with a population of about 687,000. Nevertheless, its banking system plays an essential role in the growth and development of the country. This paper analyzes the financial performance, the development and growth of bank and non-bank financial institutions of Bhutan for the period 1999-2008 using both traditional and data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA analysis shows that financial institutions in are efficient and Bhutan National Bank has been the most efficient one. Overall, the paper finds that the ROE of the financial institutions in Bhutan are comparable to the international banks.