Neutrality in the choice of number of firms or level of fixed costs in calibrating an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module for applied general equilibrium models

This paper shows how an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012) can be calibrated, and clarifies the choice of initial levels for two kinds of number of firms, or parameter values for two kinds of fixed costs, that enter a Melitz-type specification can be set freely to any preferred value, just as the cases we derive quantities from given value data assuming some of the initial prices to be unity. In consequence, only one kind of additional information, which is on the shape parameter related to productivity, just is required in order to incorporate Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms into a standard applied general equilibrium model. To be a Krugman-type, nothing is needed. This enables model builders in applied economics to fully enjoy the featured properties of the theoretical models invented by Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) in practical policy simulations at low cost.

Rethinking special and differential treatment in the WTO

Special and differential treatment (S&D) allows differentiated treatment for developing countries within the WTO system by justifying a deviation from the most-favoured-nation obligation. Since it was incorporated into the GATT (the predecessor of the WTO) in the 1960s, S&D has played a significant role in promoting the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. However, S&D is undergoing complicated and entangled discussion at the current multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda. There are a number of reasons to make opposing arguments in developed and developing countries, among which this paper focuses on two elements: diversification of developing countries and instability of preferential schemes. In order to overcome these problems and in order to make S&D more effective and operational, this paper considers the following alternative approaches: differentiation among developing countries applying the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) principle by analogy and codification of a preferential scheme as a multilateral agreement in the manner of North-South RTAs with flexibility.