6 resultados para Non-state actors
em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies
Resumo:
During the past two decades in Thailand, non-governmental actors, such as NGOs, intellectuals, and people's organizations, have found widening opportunities to participate in policy formation and in the implementation of local development. The government has facilitated the formation of civil society forums, in the expectation of influencing local-level governance. The last two national five-year development plans were formulated after taking into account the voices of people in the provinces. Even though they may seem petty, some state funds are now transmitted through non-governmental institutions for policy implementation at the grassroots level. These changes have their origin in a reformation of rural development administration in early 1980s. This reformation in due course led to policies that have allowed the participation of non-governmental actors. Meanwhile, rural people have proved their ability to engage in participatory development by forming various local organizations, while NGOs have grown to be proficient facilitators of local development. This paper describes the process whereby three leading actors, namely the government, local people, and the NGOs, have interacted to bring about a more participatory system of local development administration.
Resumo:
This paper aims to capture the changing features of local SOEs under the national SOE restructuring program in the 2000s. The national policy on SOE reform in this phase had an effect of considerably clarifying and narrowing down the raison d'être of SOEs, which has been put into practice at the local level through provincial master plans. Consequently, some signs of an important change are observed: the structure of the local SOE sector is being standardized to a certain extent, and the remaining local SOEs are becoming more geared to the needs of a market economy. This trend would have far-reaching implications for the policy implementation and public service delivery by localities, which in turn would affect the long-term development of non-state sectors.
Resumo:
The Arab monarchies of the Gulf have been undergoing striking socio-economic changes caused by the ending of the rent-based welfare state model on which they had largely relied since the 1950s. In this perspective, this paper aims at examining the comparative role of local business communities in affecting the orientations and the outcomes of the policies implemented during the period of high oil prices in the 2000s. This paper pays a special attention to the impact of the Arab Spring on the state-business relations in two of the smaller Gulf monarchies (Bahrain and Oman).
Resumo:
This paper aims to explain the historical development of Australia's foreign economic policy by using an analytical framework called a 'state-society coalition' approach. This approach focuses on virtual coalitions of state and society actors that share 'belief systems' and hold similar policy ideas, goals and preferences, as basic units (policy subsystems) of policy making. Major policy changes occur when a dominant coalition is replaced by another. The paper argues that, in Australia, there have been three major state-society coalitions in the foreign economic policy issue area: 'protectionists', 'trade liberalisers' and 'optional bilateralists'. The rise and fall of these coalitions resulted in distinctive shifts of Australia's foreign economic policy in the 1980s towards unilateral and multilateral liberalisation and in the late 1990s towards bilateral trade and investment arrangements.
Resumo:
Introduction:Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly to changes in society under the centralized system. Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is applicable here. Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building. In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration (dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking that particular service on their own.
Resumo:
This paper explores migration from Bihar, one of the most underdeveloped states in India, by paying particular attention to social class (caste) and landholdings. After describing details of individual migrants, we present our preliminary findings on the determinants of migration, based on our field survey of 200 households in four villages in 2011. In terms of social class, Muslims are more likely to migrate, but Scheduled Castes do not show a high propensity to migrate as is stated in some of the existing literature where the underclass is said to be more mobile. In terms of landholdings, the probability that someone will migrate is high among the landless and smaller landholders but it decreases as the size of the landholding increases. However, as the size of the landholding increases still further, a reverse effect of landholding on decisions regarding migration moves in, with the decline in probability becoming less and less. This result confirms a non-linear relationship between landholdings and the decision to migrate. Some further research questions are raised in the paper.