3 resultados para Non-cooperative games

em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies


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In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.

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In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.

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Agricultural cooperatives in China, known as Farmers' Professional Cooperatives (FPCs), are becoming popular and have been intensely promoted by the Chinese government to improve the economic welfare of small farmers. However, very few studies on Chinese agricultural cooperatives have measured the benefits to farmers who participate in FPCs after controlling for time-invariant attributes of farmers. This paper investigates the treatment effect of participation in a rice-producing cooperative in suburban China using propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-differences (DID) method. Estimated results show that no significant difference is observed between participants and non-participants of the cooperative in terms of net income from rice production when controlling for the difference in farmers' rice incomes before the treatment. In addition, there is no significant heterogeneity of the treatment effects between large and small farmers, although the probability of participation in the cooperative is significantly higher when the size of cultivated rice farmland is greater. These results indicate that the benefits of the cooperative appear to be overestimated considering the vigorous policy supports for FPCs from the Chinese government.