13 resultados para Non-bank financial institutions
em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies
Resumo:
Based on the consolidated statements data of the universal/commercial banks (UKbank) and non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking licenses, this paper presents a keen necessity of obtaining data in detail on both sides (assets and liabilities) of their financial conditions and further analyses. Those would bring more adequate assessments on the Philippine financial system, especially with regard to each financial subsector's financing/lending preferences and behavior. The paper also presents a possibility that the skewed locational and operational distribution exists in the non-UKbank financial subsectors. It suggests there may be a significant deviation from the authorities' (the BSP, SEC and others) intended/anticipated financial system in the banking/non-bank financial institutions' real operations.
Resumo:
The Kingdom of Bhutan is a small landlocked country in South Asia, located in the eastern Himalayas, and bordered by India and China. Bhutan is a small and fragile economy with a population of about 687,000. Nevertheless, its banking system plays an essential role in the growth and development of the country. This paper analyzes the financial performance, the development and growth of bank and non-bank financial institutions of Bhutan for the period 1999-2008 using both traditional and data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA analysis shows that financial institutions in are efficient and Bhutan National Bank has been the most efficient one. Overall, the paper finds that the ROE of the financial institutions in Bhutan are comparable to the international banks.
Resumo:
The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructuring, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and ownership changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The central bank's supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks, and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.
Resumo:
This study presents an empirical analysis about corporate governance of financial institutions in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The purpose of this research is to analyze the influence of the structure of board of directors on the performance of these institutions. To examine the effect of control exerted by particular families on bank management, we estimated models where the dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), independent variables are board of directors variables, and control variables are bank management variables. Our results show that the control of corporate governance by a ruler's family within a board of directors has a positive effect on bank profitability. Our results indicate that control by a ruler's family through a bank's board of directors compensates for the inadequacy of UAE's corporate governance system.
Resumo:
This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.
Resumo:
本稿では初めに、イスラーム銀行に関する内外の研究状況について俯瞰し、その後でイスラーム銀行が設立される基にある「利子(リバー)の禁止」について述べ、そして歴史上のイスラーム金融について述べた。続いて、1970年代以降のイスラーム銀行の発展について整理した。そこでは、ダール・アル・マール・アル・イスラーミー・グループやアル・バラカ・グループなどのイスラーム銀行グループにも言及しながらイスラーム銀行の発展について述べ、また、中東や南アジア、東南アジアの主要国における状況やアフリカやヨーロッパなどへの拡大についてもまとめた。後半では、イスラーム銀行・イスラーム金融がどのような問題を抱えているかという点について、サウジアラビアを例として既存の金融体制との矛盾の問題を検討し、続いて、実際の金融活動ではムラーバハ金融やその類似手法が多く用いられていることやマレーシアでは非イスラーム教徒の中国系住民がイスラーム銀行の顧客の過半数を占めていることを示しながら、イスラーム金融でも実際には「高利回り」への志向が強まっているなど、イスラーム金融抱えている根本的な問題についても検討した。
Resumo:
This paper will document financial aspects of transactions, and trade credit supply behavior with FDI among small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) based on two original surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003. The survey was designed to capture the nature of inter-firm transactions, trade credit and other financial conditions. Literature on FDI mainly refers to technology transfer, employment or investment. This paper focuses on the role and significance of FDI in the supply of trade credit due to its trade credit enforcement technology. Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe [2006] developed a model which indicates that when a seller has higher enforcement technology or a buyer has richer liquidity, both trade credit and transaction volume will be increased. In this paper, we confirmed that FDI and G contributed to the provision of trade credit and had a positive external effect on trade credit enforcement towards China’s economy. (1) Sales towards FDI customers have the power to increase the trade credit ratio,even when controlling other factors such as choice of payment instrument, competitiveness, and expost default management. This implies that FDI does provide trade credit, not only because it has superior liquidity, but because it is also superior in terms of enforcement of trade credit repayment.(2) Cash constraints of the buyer influence the decisions concerning trade credit provided by the seller, as a model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] predicted, and this implies that strategic default is a serious concern among SMEs in China. (3) Spillover effect exists in payment enforcement technology in transactions with FDI customers.
Resumo:
It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sector’s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.
Resumo:
If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.
Resumo:
After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it was confirmed that banks lend to their related parties in many countries. The question examined in this article is whether related lending functions to alleviate the problems of asymmetric information or transfers profits from depositors and minority shareholders to related parties. The effects of related lending on the profitability and risk of banks in Indonesia are examined using panel data from 1994 to 2007 comprising a total of 74 Indonesian banks. The effects on return on asset (ROA) varied at different periods. Before and right after the crisis, a higher credit allocation to related parties increased ROA. In middle of the crisis, it turned to negative; and this has also been the case in the most recent period as the Indonesian economy has normalized. Effects of related lending on bank risk measured by the Z-score and non-performing loan is not clear. After undergoing bank restructuring, related lending has decreased and the profit structure of banks has changed.
Resumo:
The Indonesian banking sector has been restructured since Asian financial crisis and restored to soundness. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) returned to a sound level; however, the average excess capital has become too high, while credit disbursement has remained low. This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian banks and its effects on credit growth during the 2000s. The results indicate that the determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. Return on equity (ROE) affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks, and the effect of non-performing loans is mixed, differing for various bank types. Excess capital affects credit growth positively, except among foreign banks.
Resumo:
Foreign currency deposits (FCD) are prevalent in many low-income developing countries, but their impact on bank lending has rarely been examined. An examination of cross-country data indicates that a higher proportion of FCD in total deposits is associated with growth in private credit only in inflationary circumstances (over 24 percent of the annual inflation rate). FCD can lead to a decline in private credit below this threshold level of inflation. Given that FCD exhibit persistence, deregulating them in low-income countries may do more harm than good on financial development in the long term, notably after successful containment of inflation.
Resumo:
The improvement of financial intermediation functions is crucial for a robust banking system. When lending, banks have to cope with such problems as information asymmetry and adverse selection. In order to mitigate these problems, banks have to product information and improve their techniques of lending. During the 1998 financial crisis, Indonesia's banking system suffered severe damage and revealed that the country's banking intermediation functions did not work well. This paper examines the financial intermediation functions of banks in Indonesia and analyzes the importance of bank lending to firms. The focus is on medium-sized firms, and "relationship lending", one of the bank lending techniques, is used to examine financial intermediation in Indonesia. The results of logit regressions show that the relationship between a bank and a firm affects the probability of bank lending. The amount of borrowing and collateral are also affected by a firm's relationship with a bank. When viewed from the standpoint of relationship lending to medium-sized firms, Indonesian banks cannot be criticized for any malfunction of financial intermediation.