A two-dimensional analysis of the impact of outward FDI on performance at home: evidence from Japanese manufacturing firms

This paper empirically investigates two areas of changes in firm behavior and performance at home before and after investing abroad. The first change is dependent upon the type of foreign direct investment (FDI): horizontal FDI or vertical FDI. The second change is dependent upon the firm’s domestic activities: production activities or non-production activities. From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of outward FDIs differs not only by type, but according to the firm’s activities. By exploiting two types of firm-level data that enable us to distinguish between production and non-production activities, our paper provides a detailed picture of the intra-firm changes in behavior and performance that occur as a result of production globalization.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.