Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

Yangtze River Delta's system integration: institutional barriers and countermeasures

This paper addresses the issue of institutional barriers to the Yangtze River Delta integration and the resulting slow development. It analyzes the problems including the coordination of local interests and regional interests, market segmentation during the regional integration, competition for the local government‘s investment on the public goods, labor movement within the delta. The paper argues that to reduce the negative impacts of these barriers and to promote the further integration of the Yangtze Delta region, the central government should strengthen the coordination between local governments, regulate their disorderly competition and reform the official evaluation system.

Negative skill sorting across production chains

Previous literature generally predicts that individuals with higher skills work in industries with longer production chains. However, the opposite skill-sorting pattern, a "negative skill-sorting" phenomenon, is also observed in reality. This paper proposes a possible mechanism by which both cases can happen and shows that negative skill sorting is more likely to occur when the quality of intermediate inputs degrade rapidly (or improves slowly) along the production chain. We empirically confirm our theoretical prediction by using country-industry panel data. The results are robust regardless of estimation method, control variables, and industry coverage. This study has important implications for understanding countries' comparative advantages and development patterns.