The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55 and U.S.-R.O.C Relations

On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling Quemoy (Jinmen), one of the Kuomintang-held offshore islands, setting off the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. This paper focuses on the crisis and analyzes the following three questions: (1) What was the policy the U.S. took towards the Republic of China (R.O.C), especially towards the offshore islands, to try to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? (2) What were the intentions of the U.S. government in trying to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? And (3) how should U.S. policy towards the R.O.C. which led to solving the Taiwan Strait Crisis be positioned in the history of Sino-American relations? Through analysis of these questions, this study concludes that the position the U.S. took to bring an end to crisis, one which prevented China from “liberating Taiwan” and the Kuomintang from “attacking the mainland,” brought about the existence of a de facto “two-China” situation.

Taiwan strait crises and Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking : a perspective from the Taiwan's archive

This paper uses Taiwan's archival documents to reexamine the two Taiwan Strait crises and the characteristics of Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking. Section 2 examines the oscillation of U.S. policy concerning the ROC's offensive toward mainland China and the defense of the Da-chen islands before and after the initiation of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-1955. Doing so will highlight the contradictory U.S. attitude that contributed to the crisis and weakened its ability to control Chiang. Section 3 focuses on Chiang Kai-shek's strategic vision toward East Asia. In particular, this section focuses on his strategic thinking and tries to assess whether or not he was a "reckless" or "irrational" leader as often described in the previous research on his personality.