3 resultados para Morality of Governance Systems
em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies
A Mathematical Representation of "Excitement" in Games: A Contribution to the Theory of Game Systems
Resumo:
Researchers have long believed the concept of "excitement" in games to be subjective and difficult to measure. This paper presents the development of a mathematically computable index that measures the concept from the viewpoint of an audience and from that of a player. One of the key aspects of the index is the differential of the probability of "winning" before and after one specific "play" in a given game. The index makes a large contribution to the study of games and enables researchers to compare and analyze the “excitement” of various games. It may be applied in many fields, especially the area of welfare economics, and applications may range from those related to allocative efficiency to axioms of justice and equity.
Resumo:
In Kazakhstan, uncover of numerous corruption scandals involving government officials has become almost a normal feature of life. Behind the high-profile acts of waging a battle against corruption, however, is a serious and systemic phenomenon. The most endemic form of corruption is the various transfers of funds in the state structures and national companies which remain opaque and thus unaccounted for. There are questions about the volumes and spending of revenues earned from natural resources, and there is no independent monitoring and control of the flow of funds in national oil and gas companies. The main actors involved in the shadow economy are state officials and informal pressure groups, who distribute resources among themselves, and accumulate wealth by way of legalising informal incomes or obtaining official business using connections. While important decision making is carried out among the close circles of the elite, formal institutions remain weak and ineffective.
Resumo:
This study deals with the issue of corporate governance in the case of Indonesian business groups. It examines what factors can be attributed to failures of corporate governance. Through case studies of six different types of business groups, it evidences that self-governance by owner-managers can function well if there is no other key stakeholder and no collusion with the government. When this is not the case, however, self-governance does not work, and governance by creditors or professional managers over owner-managers has limitations. For better corporate governance, there is a need not only for building internal governance mechanism of business groups, but also for strengthening external monitoring institutions including creditors, capital markets, the governmental as well as non-governmental systems.