Transformation of the Rice Marketing System and Myanmar's Transition to a Market Economy

Creating a rice marketing system has been one of the central policy issues in Myanmar's move to a market economy since the end of the 1980s. Two liberalizations of rice marketing were implemented in 1987 and 2003. This paper examines the essential aspects of the liberalizations and the subsequent transformation of Myanmar's rice marketing sector. It attempts to bring into clearer focus the rationale of the government's rice marketing reforms which is to maintain a stable supply of rice at a low price to consumers. Under this rationale, however, the state rice marketing sector continued to lose efficiency while the private sector was allowed to develop on condition that it did not jeopardize the rationale of stable supply at low price. The paper concludes that the prospect for the future development of the private rice marketing sector is dim since a change in the rice market's rationale is unlikely. Private rice exporting is unlikely to be permitted, while the domestic market is approaching the saturation point. Thus, there is little momentum for the private rice sector to undertake any substantial expansion of investment.

Myanmar's two decades of partial transition to a market economy : a negative legacy for the new government

Despite more than two decades of transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, Myanmar’s economic transition is still only partly complete. The government’s initial strategy for dealing with the swelling deficits of the state economic enterprises (SEEs) was to put them under direct control in order to scrutinize their expenditures. This policy change postponed restructuring and exacerbated the soft budget constraint problem of the SEEs. While the installation of a new government in March 2011 has increased prospects for economic development, sustainable growth still requires full-scale structural reform of the SEEs and institutional infrastructure building. Myanmar can learn from the gradual approaches to economic transition in China and Vietnam, where partial reforms weakened further impetus for reforms.

Using the input-output approach to measure participation in GVCs : the case of Costa Rica

In order to illustrate how the input-output approach can be used to explore various aspects of a country's participation in GVCs, this paper applies indicators derived from the concept of trade in value-added (TiVA) to the case of Costa Rica. We intend to provide developing countries that seek to foster GVC-driven structural transformation with an example that demonstrates an effective way to measure progress. The analysis presented in this paper makes use of an International Input-Output Table (IIOT) that was constructed by including Costa Rica's first Input-Output Table (IOT) into an existing IIOT. The TiVA indicator has been used to compare and contrast import flows, export flows and bilateral trade balances in terms of gross trade and trade in value-added. The country's comparative advantage is discussed based on a TiVA-related indicator of revealed comparative advantage. The paper also decomposes the domestic content of value added in each sector and measures the degree of fragmentation in the value chains in which Costa Rica participates, highlighting the partner countries that add the most value.

Competition of the mechanisms : how Chinese home appliance firms coped with default risk of trade credit?

During the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy in 1990s of China, there was a considerable accrual of deferred payment, and default due to inferior enforcement institutions. This is a very common phenomenon in the transition economies at that time. Interviews with home electronics appliance firms revealed that firms coped with this problem by adjusting their sales mechanisms (found four types), and the benefit of institutions was limited. A theoretical analysis claim that spot and integration are inferior to contracts, a contract with a rebate on volume and prepayment against an exclusive agent can realize the lowest cost and price. The empirical part showed that mechanisms converged into a mechanism with the rebate on volume an against exclusive agent and its price level is the lowest. The competition is the driving force of the convergence of mechanisms and improvement risk management capacity.