The foundation of the Mexican welfare state and social security reform in the 1990s

Before 1982 Mexico's welfare state regime was a limited conservative one that put priority on the social security of organized labor. But following the country's debt crisis in 1982, this regime changed to a hybrid liberal model. The Ernest Zedillo government (1995-2000) in particular pushed ahead with liberal reform of the social security system. This paper examines the characteristics and the policy making of the social security reforms in the 1990s. The results suggest that underlying these reforms was the restructuring of the economy and the need to cope with the cost of this restructuring. The paper also points out that one of the main factors making possible the rapid execution of the reforms were the weakened political clout of the officialist labor unions due to their steady breakdown during the 1990s and the increase in the monopolistic power of the state vis-a-vis the position of labor during the negotiations on social security reforms.

Transformation and continuity of the Argentine welfare state -- evaluating social security reform in the 1990s

Beginning after World War II, Argentina institutionalized a limited conservative corporatist welfare state where occupation-linked social insurance held a central position and social assistance had a residual character. This was called a limited conservative corporatist welfare state, because the huge population within the informal sector was excluded from the main system. A populist government supported by trade unions and the economic model of import-substituting industrialization were the background for the formation of this type of welfare state. During the 1990s, elements of a liberal regime were added to the Argentine welfare state under the reform carried out by the Menem Peronist government. However, social insurance reform and labor reform were not as drastic as the economic reform. They still retained a certain continuity from the traditional systems. The government intended to carry out more drastic social security and labor reform, but was unable to do so due to the legacy of corporatism of the Peronist government.

Cuba's social policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union -- social development as legitimacy of regime and its economy effectiveness

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cuba has experienced a severe economic crisis, and the country's social policy has played an important role in showing the people a raison-d'etre for the revolution. This role has become even stronger in recent years, as internal and external actors demand political reforms and economic liberalization. This article first examines the Cuban government's use of social development to counter the demands for changes. It then looks at the extent that government social policy contributes economically to improving the Cuban living standard. The article demonstrates empirically how the leadership emphasizes their social accomplishments whenever demands for change come, and then shows that after the suspension of Soviet aid, Cuban social policy has been able to provide services mainly by relying on human capital and reducing quality materially because of the shortage of foreign reserves. This has limited the economic effectiveness of the services.

On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.