Accession clause of TPP : Is it really open?

One of the most important policy questions relating to the future impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the global and regional economy is whether other countries in the region, particularly China, will join the partnership. While several commentators have made some observations regarding the future prospects of TPP expansion, little scholarly analysis has been conducted. To go beyond the speculation of a certain country's accession to TPP, we first attempt to generalize the issue before moving on to a specific question. We conduct a comparative analysis of a large number of regional trade agreements for a better understanding of the parameters of RTAs that are critical for membership expansion. This general framework enables us to conduct a systematic examination of specific membership expansion cases, such as China's membership in TPP. The paper also proposes a necessary "accession practice" that truly facilitates new members' participation.

Dynamics of investment negotiations between China and Japan : the China-Japan-Korea trilateral investment treaty and beyond

The investment agreement relationship between China and Japan is complex. The many intersecting and overlapping agreements can rightly be described as a "noodle bowl of agreements." The 1989 bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between China and Japan still stands. Japan can also free-ride on the negotiation outcome of China's BITs and free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries by using the most-favored-nation (MFN) provision in the 1989 China-Japan BIT, which does not contain regional economic integration organization (REIO) exception rules. However, because the China-Japan BIT does not have investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), it may face implementation problems. The China-Japan-Korea trilateral investment treaty (CJK TIT), in force since 2014, made improvements upon the 1989 BIT, but Japan is not entirely satisfied with the outcome. For Japan, pre-establishment national treatment (NT) and prohibition of various types of performance requirements are the most important negotiation items, but the CJK TIT insufficiently addressed those problems. Moreover, because the CJK TIT has MFN provisions with an REIO exception rule, better access to investment markets brought about by future FTAs such as the China-Korea FTA and the EU-China FTA cannot be imported into CJK TIT. Hence, in the long run, Japan needs to pursue an FTA investment chapter with China that covers both MFN and ISDS.

The emerging ASEAN approach to mutual recognition : a comparison with Europe, trans-Tasman, and North America

Existing studies on mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) are mostly based on the European experience. In this paper, we will examine the ongoing attempts to establish a mutual recognition architecture in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and seek to explain the region's unique approach to MRAs, which can be classified as a "hub and spoke" model of mutual recognition. On one hand, ASEAN is attempting to establish a quasi-supranational ASEAN-level mechanism to confer "ASEAN qualification" effective in the entire ASEAN region. On the other hand, ASEAN MRAs respect members' national sovereignty, and it is national authorities, not ASEAN institutions, who have the ultimate power to approve or disapprove the supply of services by ASEAN qualification holders. Such a mixed approach to mutual recognition can be best understood as a centralized mechanism for learning-by-doing, rather than centralized recognition per se.