Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.

Impacts of tertiary canal irrigation -- impact evaluation of an infrastructure project

We estimate the economic impacts of irrigation using the panel data set from rural Thailand. We employed difference-in-differences estimation and showed that tertiary irrigation has unexpected impacts. Contrary to the local experts predicitions that it should have substantial productivity impacts as it allows better water controls for farmers, we found largely zero profitability impacts. Another unexpected finding is that, while profitability is not affected, we see an increase in cultivation probability with the construction of tertiary canals. This is observed in both wet and dry seasons. This finding suggests that Thai farmers are willing to expand operation scale once they get water.