3 resultados para International sanctions
em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies
Resumo:
Easing of economic sanctions by Western countries in 2012 augmented the prospect that Myanmar will expand its exports. On the other hand, a sharp rise in natural resource exports during the sanctions brings in a concern about the "Dutch disease". This study projects Myanmar's export potential by calculating counterfactual export values with an augmented gravity model that takes into account the effects of natural resource exports on non-resource exports. Without taking into account the effects of natural resource exports, the counterfactual predicted values of non-resource exports during 2004–2011 are more than five times larger than the actual exports. If we take into account the effects, however, the predicted values are smaller than the actual exports. The empirical results imply that the "Dutch disease" is at stake in Myanmar than any other Southeast Asian countries.
Resumo:
Myanmar’s apparel industry had long been denied access to Western markets due to sanctions against its military government. The birth of a "civilian" government in March 2011 improved Myanmar’s relations with the international community, and Western sanctions were largely lifted. Regained market access is expected to trigger rapid growth of Myanmar’s apparel exports. This paper examines this impact with a comparison to Vietnam’s apparel industry. The industry’s prospects are getting bright, but the business environment has recently changed drastically in Myanmar. A new challenge for Myanmar’s apparel industry is remaining globally competitive. This paper also examines advantages and disadvantages that apparel firms in Myanmar experience. Although its abundance of low-wage workers remains a source of competitiveness, Myanmar needs its government to play a more active role to build the foundation of the industry.
Resumo:
International politics affects oil trade. But does it affect the oil-exporting developing countries more? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to changes in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To the extent that developing countries have higher hold-up risks because of their weaker institutions, the political effect on oil trade should be more significant in the developing world. We find that oil import decisions are indeed more elastic when firms import from developing countries, although the reverse is true in the short run. Our results suggest that international politics can affect oil revenue and hence long-term development in the developing world.