Industrial Development and the Innovation System of the Ethanol Sector in Brazil

The purpose of this paper is to analyze innovations and the innovation system and its dynamics in the ethanol sector in the State of Sao Paulo. More specifically, this paper focuses on the development process in the sector, the public policies taken to promote the sector, and the organizations and key players involved in these policies and their responses to unforeseeable changes in economic, social and technological environments. To this end, this paper takes an historical perspective and reviews data on the cultivation of sugar cane, the production of ethanol, and on sugar cane yields as indicators of the innovations achieved in the sector. The geographical distribution of these indicators is also examined. Next, several cases in Piracicaba and Campinas in the State of Sao Paulo are presented; these give us a more concrete idea of the processes involved in innovation and technology transfer. Based on these observations, the ethanol cluster and the innovation system of the State of Sao Paulo are discussed from the viewpoint of the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy.

Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

Factors Underlying the Formation of Industrial Clusters in Japan and Industrial Cluster Policy: A Quantitative Survey

The purpose of this report is to use information provided by a questionnaire survey to analyze the factors and processes underlying the formation of industrial clusters in Japan. The study, based on questionnaire surveys, forms part of an "Industrial Cluster Project". The Japanese government has implemented policies for industrial clusters so as to enable Japanese industries to maintain competitive power in global markets, and to aid the self-sufficient expansion of local industries. The government's project goes under the heading "Industry Agglomeration for the Recovery of Local Industries with respect to so-called "Industry Clusters." The authors aim to identify what expectations are held of government by the enterprises that make up industrial clusters. As part of our investigation, we used the results of a survey conducted by UNDP in 2004. Tsuji's study, published by the Osaka School of International Public Policy, surveyed 1198 small or medium sized manufacturing companies located in O ward, Tokyo and Higashi Osaka city, Osaka prefecture. The outcome of the present study, together with data from Tsuji's work on IT usage by SMEs in Japan, is meant to form the basis for policy design and implementation.

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.

Clusters and Innovation: Beijing's Hi-technology Industry Cluster and Guangzhou's Automobile Industry Cluster

This paper proposes a flowchart approach to the automobile industry cluster policy and the hi-technology industry cluster policy to prioritize policy measures. First, in the automobile industry cluster, suppliers of parts and components to anchor firms such as Honda, Nissan and Toyota of Japanese assembly makers in Guangzhou, China, can innovate partly because the suppliers have become independent of their anchor firms in the Japanese Keiretsu system. Second, concerning the hi-technology industry clustering in Beijing, we show that the existence of universities is a precondition for the industrial cluster policy and that the leadership of the Zhongguancun Science Park Management Committee of Beijing Municipality is crucial to the success of the industrial cluster policy. The flowchart for the hi-technology industry is different from the one for the automobile industry cluster.