FDI and investment barriers in developing economies

Does investment liberalization in developing economies affect FDI decisions differently across individual firms? To address this question, we simulate the response of individual firms to reductions in investment costs across developing economies. We explore two policy experiments: elimination of setup-procedure requirements for foreign investors and a reduction in corporate tax rates on foreign-owned multinationals. We find that a relaxing of discriminatory foreign investment procedures induces middle productive firms to increase their entry and production in developing economies substantially, but the most productive firms to expand moderately. Multinationals expand their entry and production in developing economies more substantially following a decline in entry barriers than following a decrease in corporate tax rates.

Why do oil importers diversify their import sources politically? : evidence from U.S. firm-level data

International politics affects oil trade. But why? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine what kinds of firms are more responsive to change in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To test this hold-up risk hypothesis, we investigate heterogeneity in responses by matching transaction-level import data with firm-level worldwide reserves. Our results show that long-run oil import decisions are indeed more elastic for firms with oil reserves overseas than those without, although the reverse is true in the short run. We interpret this empirical regularity as that while firms trade in the spot market can adjust their imports immediately, vertically-integrated firms with investment overseas tend to commit to term contracts in the short run even though they are more responsive to changes in international politics in the long run.