Monetary Systems in Developing Countries: An Unorthodox View

This paper analyzes some recent theoretical and practical evidence in terms of economic results of different exchange rate systems. It begins with a historical review and a summary of fixed versus flexible exchange rate systems. Then it compares the experiences of recent currency unions, mostly unilateral, and their relative economic performance during the past currency crises in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe. A set of issues is discussed in order to weigh the overall costs and benefits for several economies. These issues include exchange rates, GDP performance, inflation rates and foreign reserves. The case of Argentina is also considered separately, comparing mostly seigniorage costs and interest-rate savings. The benefits and costs of the producers (central banks/governments) and the consumers (citizens) of money are discussed separately. Free banking is also considered in a fast-changing world where there will probably be fewer but better currencies. Not just the euro is a reality now, but maybe the "amero" and the "worldo" or the "mondo" very soon.

Establishing electoral administration systems in new democracies

The difficulty of holding fair elections continues to be a critical problem in many newly democratized countries. The core of the problem is the electoral administration's lack of political autonomy and capability to regulate fraud. This paper seeks to identify the conditions for establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration system. An electoral administration system has two main functions: to disclose the nature of elections and to prevent fraud. We argue in this paper that an autonomous and capable electoral administration system exists if the major political players have the incentive to disclose the information on the elections and to secure the ruler's credible commitment to fair elections. We examine this argument through comparative case studies of Korea and the Philippines. Despite similar historical and institutional settings, their election commissions exhibit contrasting features. The difference in the incentive structures of the major political players seems to have caused the divergence in the institutional evolution of the election commissions in the two countries.