An Institutional Analysis of Environmental Pollution Disputes in Taiwan: Cases of 'Self-Relief'

During the late 1980s and early 1990s in Taiwan, people's protests against environmental pollution often took the form of "self-relief," meaning that they attempted to fight polluters using their own resources, without relying on legal or administrative procedures. Why did such an extreme form of disputes become so widespread? What institutional changes did these movements bring about? These questions are analyzed using the analytical framework of "law and economics." Our research shows that "self-relief" functioned to a certain extent as a means of realizing quick compensation for victims, and for reflecting the opinions of local people concerning development projects; in addition, it served to promote the formulation of law and administrative systems. However, as it was based on direct negotiations between the parties concerned, the outcome of each dispute only reflected the transient balance of forces, and the experience gained in negotiations was not accumulated as a social norm.

Management for a Variety of Environmental Pollution and North-South Trade

A simple static model incorporating a variety of environmental pollution is developed. An autarky model shows that a developing country regulates fewer types of pollution by income-induced environmental policy. As income grows, the types of regulated pollution increase and also introduced regulations become tougher.Then the model incorporates international trade between a developed country and a developing country. The model gives a new interpretation for the pollution haven hypothesis. Some types of pollution abated with inefficient technology are emitted more in a developing country but other types necessarily increase in a developed country in order to meet the trade balance.