Exchange Rate Stabilization and IMF High Interest Rate Policy: A Critical Reconsideration Using a Dynamic Model

This paper examines whether the IMF high interest rate policy was suitable for crisis-ridden East Asian economies. Using an "overshoot" model similar to that of Dornbusch's (1976), it shows that this sort of policy might cause an unnecessary deflationary adjusting process and have no effect on containing the real depreciation of exchange rates in the long run. The study also demonstrates that Thai economic data coincides quite well with the model presented here. Finally, it points out that the high interest policy itself might provoke high risk-premium, the existence of which, in turn, justifies the policy. This means that the policy has a self-fulfilling property. In conclusion, a "one-size-fits-all" adaptation of high interest rate policy in a currency crisis is very dangerous in general, and was inappropriate for East Asia. The desirable policy would have been to let currencies depreciate and keep interest rates stable.

Liability dollarization and fear of floating

This paper explores the idea that fear of floating can be justified as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in a dollarized emerging economy. Specifically, I consider a small open economy in which intermediate goods importers borrow in foreign currency and face a credit constraint. In this economy, exchange rate depreciation not only worsens importers' net-worth but also increases the financing amount in domestic currency, therefore exaggerating their borrowing finance premium. Besides, because of high exchange rate pass-through into import prices, fluctuations in the exchange rate also have strong impacts on domestic prices and production. These effects, together, magnify the macroeconomic consequences of the floating exchange rate policy in response to external shocks. The paper shows that the floating exchange rate regime is dominated by the fixed exchange rate regime in the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms.