19 resultados para Government financial institutions
em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies
Resumo:
The Kingdom of Bhutan is a small landlocked country in South Asia, located in the eastern Himalayas, and bordered by India and China. Bhutan is a small and fragile economy with a population of about 687,000. Nevertheless, its banking system plays an essential role in the growth and development of the country. This paper analyzes the financial performance, the development and growth of bank and non-bank financial institutions of Bhutan for the period 1999-2008 using both traditional and data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA analysis shows that financial institutions in are efficient and Bhutan National Bank has been the most efficient one. Overall, the paper finds that the ROE of the financial institutions in Bhutan are comparable to the international banks.
Resumo:
Based on the consolidated statements data of the universal/commercial banks (UKbank) and non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking licenses, this paper presents a keen necessity of obtaining data in detail on both sides (assets and liabilities) of their financial conditions and further analyses. Those would bring more adequate assessments on the Philippine financial system, especially with regard to each financial subsector's financing/lending preferences and behavior. The paper also presents a possibility that the skewed locational and operational distribution exists in the non-UKbank financial subsectors. It suggests there may be a significant deviation from the authorities' (the BSP, SEC and others) intended/anticipated financial system in the banking/non-bank financial institutions' real operations.
Resumo:
The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructuring, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and ownership changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The central bank's supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks, and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.
Resumo:
This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.
Resumo:
This paper will document financial aspects of transactions, and trade credit supply behavior with FDI among small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) based on two original surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003. The survey was designed to capture the nature of inter-firm transactions, trade credit and other financial conditions. Literature on FDI mainly refers to technology transfer, employment or investment. This paper focuses on the role and significance of FDI in the supply of trade credit due to its trade credit enforcement technology. Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe [2006] developed a model which indicates that when a seller has higher enforcement technology or a buyer has richer liquidity, both trade credit and transaction volume will be increased. In this paper, we confirmed that FDI and G contributed to the provision of trade credit and had a positive external effect on trade credit enforcement towards China’s economy. (1) Sales towards FDI customers have the power to increase the trade credit ratio,even when controlling other factors such as choice of payment instrument, competitiveness, and expost default management. This implies that FDI does provide trade credit, not only because it has superior liquidity, but because it is also superior in terms of enforcement of trade credit repayment.(2) Cash constraints of the buyer influence the decisions concerning trade credit provided by the seller, as a model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] predicted, and this implies that strategic default is a serious concern among SMEs in China. (3) Spillover effect exists in payment enforcement technology in transactions with FDI customers.
Resumo:
It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sector’s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.
Resumo:
本稿では初めに、イスラーム銀行に関する内外の研究状況について俯瞰し、その後でイスラーム銀行が設立される基にある「利子(リバー)の禁止」について述べ、そして歴史上のイスラーム金融について述べた。続いて、1970年代以降のイスラーム銀行の発展について整理した。そこでは、ダール・アル・マール・アル・イスラーミー・グループやアル・バラカ・グループなどのイスラーム銀行グループにも言及しながらイスラーム銀行の発展について述べ、また、中東や南アジア、東南アジアの主要国における状況やアフリカやヨーロッパなどへの拡大についてもまとめた。後半では、イスラーム銀行・イスラーム金融がどのような問題を抱えているかという点について、サウジアラビアを例として既存の金融体制との矛盾の問題を検討し、続いて、実際の金融活動ではムラーバハ金融やその類似手法が多く用いられていることやマレーシアでは非イスラーム教徒の中国系住民がイスラーム銀行の顧客の過半数を占めていることを示しながら、イスラーム金融でも実際には「高利回り」への志向が強まっているなど、イスラーム金融抱えている根本的な問題についても検討した。
Resumo:
If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.
Resumo:
This study presents an empirical analysis about corporate governance of financial institutions in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The purpose of this research is to analyze the influence of the structure of board of directors on the performance of these institutions. To examine the effect of control exerted by particular families on bank management, we estimated models where the dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), independent variables are board of directors variables, and control variables are bank management variables. Our results show that the control of corporate governance by a ruler's family within a board of directors has a positive effect on bank profitability. Our results indicate that control by a ruler's family through a bank's board of directors compensates for the inadequacy of UAE's corporate governance system.
Resumo:
We obtain the three following conclusions. First, business cycles depend on prices of stocks and primary commodities such as crude oil. Second, stock prices and oil prices generate psychological cycles with different periods. Third, there exist cases of "negative bubble" under certain conditions. Integrating the above results, we can find a role of a government in financial market in developing countries.
Resumo:
This paper addresses the rationale for financial cooperation in East Asia. It begins by giving a brief review of developments after the Asian currency crisis, and argues that enhancing regional financial cooperation both quantitatively and qualitatively will require: (1) upgrading surveillance capabilities in the region, and (2) creating a clear division of labor between regional institutions and the IMF. It also mentions the issue of membership and the background forces that have led to the duplication of similar forums in East Asia. Although the concern over crisis management is the central issue in East Asian financial cooperation, other issues such as exchange rate policy coordination and fostering regional capital markets are discussed as well.
Resumo:
This paper reviews the relationship between public sector investment and private sector investment through government expenditures financed by government bonds in the Japanese economy. This study hypothesizes that deficit financing by bond issues does not crowd out private sector investment, and this finance method may crowd in. Thus the government increases bond issues and sells them in the domestic and international financial markets. This method does not affect interest rates because they are insensitive to government expenditures and they depend on interest rates levels in the international financial market more than in the domestic financial market because of globalization and integration among financial markets.
Resumo:
Foreign currency deposits (FCD) are prevalent in many low-income developing countries, but their impact on bank lending has rarely been examined. An examination of cross-country data indicates that a higher proportion of FCD in total deposits is associated with growth in private credit only in inflationary circumstances (over 24 percent of the annual inflation rate). FCD can lead to a decline in private credit below this threshold level of inflation. Given that FCD exhibit persistence, deregulating them in low-income countries may do more harm than good on financial development in the long term, notably after successful containment of inflation.
Resumo:
This is to analyzes the operational behavior and technical progress among Philippine domestic banks, using micro-level data on individual banks. First, we summarize their major business activities and gain insight on how the structure is changing. Then, we formally estimate the cost function of Philippine domestic banks using panel data covering a seven-year period (1990-96). The presence of economies of scale and economies of scope is investigated and technical progress in the banking industry is measured. In addition, the results of analysis for the Philippines are compared with those of similar studies on Thailand conducted by the author previously.
Resumo:
Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.