Trade Credits under Imperfect Enforcement: A Theory with a Test on Chinese Experience

It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sector’s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.

Theory of a Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy

A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy emphasizes the importance ofthe ordering of policy measures. The flow of policy implementation is to establish an industrial zone, to invite an anchor company, and to promote its related companies to invest in the industrial zone. This article delineated "a flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy" by proposing sufficient conditions for forming industrial clusters typical in the manufacturing industry in Asia to enhance regional economic growth. The typical industrial cluster policy was theorized by defining an industrial zone as "quasi-public goods", and it was shown that the policy enhances economic growth under a production function of "increasing returns to scale" of an anchor company. Critical amounts of the production of "scale economies" that are used by the related companies to decide whether or not to invest in clusters were also shown.