Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

Market efficiency of commodity futures in India

This paper aims to examine the market efficiency of the commodity futures market in India, which has been growing phenomenally for the last few years. We estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship between the multi-commodity futures and spot prices and then test for market efficiency in a weak form sense by applying both the DOLS and the FMOLS methods. The entire sample period is from 2 January 2006 to 31 March 2011. The results indicate that a cointegrating relationship is found between these indices and that the commodity futures market seems to be efficient only during the more recent sub-sample period since July 2009.