Forestry Sector Reform and Distributional Change of Natural Resource Rent in Indonesia

After the collapse of the centralized Soeharto regime, deforestation caused by over-logging accelerated. To tackle this problem, an IMF/World Bank-led forestry sector reform program adopted a market-friendly approach involving the resumption of round wood exports and raising of the resource rent fee, with the aim to stop rent accumulation by plywood companies, which had enjoyed a supply of round wood at privileged prices. The Indonesian government, for its part, decentralized the forest concession management system to provide incentives for local governments and communities to carry out sustainable forest management. However, neither policy reform worked effectively. The round wood export ban was reimposed and the forest management system centralized again with cooperation from a newly funded industry-led institution. In the midst of the confusion surrounding the policy reversal, the gap between the price of round wood in international and domestic markets failed to contract, although rent allocations to plywood industries were reduced during 1998-2003. The rents were not collected properly by the government, but accumulated unexpectedly in the hands of players in the black market for round wood.

Allocation efficiency in China : an extension of the dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition

This paper develops a quantitative measure of allocation efficiency, which is an extension of the dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition proposed by Melitz and Polanec (2015). The extended measure enables the simultaneous capture of the degree of misallocation within a group and between groups and parallel to capturing the contribution of entering and exiting firms to aggregate productivity growth. This measure empirically assesses the degree of misallocation in China using manufacturing firm-level data from 2004 to 2007. Misallocation among industrial sectors has been found to increase over time, and allocation efficiency within an industry has been found to worsen in industries that use more capital and have firms with relatively higher state-owned market shares. Allocation efficiency among three ownership sectors (state-owned, domestic private, and foreign sectors) tends to improve in industries wherein the market share moves from a less-productive state-owned sector to a more productive private sector.