An Institutional Analysis of Environmental Pollution Disputes in Taiwan: Cases of 'Self-Relief'

During the late 1980s and early 1990s in Taiwan, people's protests against environmental pollution often took the form of "self-relief," meaning that they attempted to fight polluters using their own resources, without relying on legal or administrative procedures. Why did such an extreme form of disputes become so widespread? What institutional changes did these movements bring about? These questions are analyzed using the analytical framework of "law and economics." Our research shows that "self-relief" functioned to a certain extent as a means of realizing quick compensation for victims, and for reflecting the opinions of local people concerning development projects; in addition, it served to promote the formulation of law and administrative systems. However, as it was based on direct negotiations between the parties concerned, the outcome of each dispute only reflected the transient balance of forces, and the experience gained in negotiations was not accumulated as a social norm.

Formless as Water, Flaming as a Fire-Some observations on the Theory and Practice of Self-Determination

The concept of national self-determination is a highly contested concept from very outset. It is partly due to its dual parentage, namely nationalism and liberalism. Prior to 1945 it was only a political concept without legal binding. With the incorporation of the principle in the UN Charter it was universalized and legalized. However, there were two competing interpretations at the UN based on de-colonization and representative government. How to define self and what really determined remain highly controversial. How to reconcile the international norm of sovereignty of state and self determination of people became more complex problem with the tide of secessionist movements based on ethno-nationalism. The concept of internal self-determination came as a compromise; but it is also very vague and harbors a wide range of interpretations.

Liability dollarization and fear of floating

This paper explores the idea that fear of floating can be justified as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in a dollarized emerging economy. Specifically, I consider a small open economy in which intermediate goods importers borrow in foreign currency and face a credit constraint. In this economy, exchange rate depreciation not only worsens importers' net-worth but also increases the financing amount in domestic currency, therefore exaggerating their borrowing finance premium. Besides, because of high exchange rate pass-through into import prices, fluctuations in the exchange rate also have strong impacts on domestic prices and production. These effects, together, magnify the macroeconomic consequences of the floating exchange rate policy in response to external shocks. The paper shows that the floating exchange rate regime is dominated by the fixed exchange rate regime in the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms.