Measuring fixed costs for firms' use of a free trade agreement : threshold regression approach

In this paper, by employing the threshold regression method, we estimate the average tariff equivalent of fixed costs for the use of a free trade agreement (FTA) among all existing FTAs in the world. It is estimated to be 3.2%. This global estimate serves as a reference rate in the evaluation of each FTA’s fixed costs.

How do free trade agreements reduce tariff rates and non-tariff barriers?

This paper empirically investigates how far free trade agreements (FTAs) successfully lower tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for manufacturing industries by employing the bilateral tariff and NTB data in a time series for countries around the world. We find that FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause contribute to reducing tariff rates by 2.1% points and 1.5% points, respectively. In the case of NTBs, their respective impacts are 6.6% points and 5.7% points. Membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not contribute greatly to reducing tariff rates but does play a significant role in reducing NTBs. These results provide important implications for the literature on numerical assessments of FTAs.

Preferential trade agreements and antidumping actions against members and nonmembers

In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes a country's decisions concerning antidumping (AD) action against two foreign countries and the relationship between those decisions and regional trade agreements (RTAs). An RTA intensifies product-market competition in the markets of member countries and lowers product prices, while it raises export prices of goods subject to tariff reductions. This effect widens the dumping margin of the non-member firm and narrows the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government is more concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the member's AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently high value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against the member. If the governments' weight on the domestic firm's profit is neither high nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions against both countries.