3 resultados para Expectations in the popular game

em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies


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Historically, the authority to conclude international treaties was exclusively exercised by administrative bodies (or the chief of state). However, recent studies pointed out that the present legislative bodies have come to play a more active role through ratification or the review of treaties in European and American countries. Harrington (2005) studied judicial reform in British dominions and criticized the past executive-dominant treaty-making process as a “democratic deficit” due to a fear that under this system the nation might be bound by international agreements for which a consensus had not been obtained. These studies indicated that people’s participation in the treaty-making process has increased on a global basis, but neither of them provides sufficient descriptive evidence regarding why and how such procedures were established. The present paper therefore attempts to solve these questions by analyzing the legislative and political process of the treaty-making procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 constitution as a case study.

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The preference utilization ratio, i.e., the share of imports under preferential tariff schemes out of total imports, has been a popular indicator for measuring the usage of preferential tariffs vis-à-vis tariffs on a most-favored-nation basis. A crucial shortcoming of this measure is the data requirements, particularly for import value data classified by tariff schemes, which are not available in most countries. This study proposes an alternative measure for preferential tariff utilization, termed the "tariff exemption ratio." This measure offers the unique advantage of needing only publicly available data, such as those provided by the World Development Indicators, for its computations. We can thus calculate this measure for most countries for an international comparison. Our finding is that tariff exemption ratios differ widely across countries, with a global average of approximately 50%.