Executive Managers in Peru's Family Businesses

As in many other developing countries, family businesses are major players in the Peruvian economy. Despite their growth into large-scale groups spanning a wide range of businesses, the owner families still have strong control over their ownership and management. However, Peru's liberal economic reforms in the 1990s brought intense competition into the national market. Not only have these family businesses been forced to compete against large-scale foreign capital that entered the national market through the privatization of state enterprises, but also against cheap goods imported from foreign countries. In order to compete, family businesses have had to move beyond the limited human resources available within the family. The advancement within owner families of new generations with better education and training together with the promotion to top managerial positions of professional salaried managers from outside the family are some of the measures owner families are taking to overcome their human resource limitations.

Executive Managers in Large Mexican Family Businesses

The involvement of members of owners' families in the running of large family businesses in Mexico is decreasing. Although family members still hold key posts such as that of CEO, other executive posts tend to be delegated to professional salaried managers. Top managers, including family members, share some common characteristics. They are young compared with managers in other developed countries, their quality as human resources is high, and many of them are graduates of overseas MBA courses. Most of them are sufficiently experienced. Improvement of quality among top managers is a recent phenomenon in Mexico, and has been encouraged mainly by the following two factors. First, globalization of business activities was promoted by intense competition among firms under conditions of market liberalization. In order to equip themselves with the ability to cope with the globalization of their operations, large family businesses tried hard to improve the quality of top management, by training and educating existing managers, and/or by recruiting managers in the outside labor market. Second, developments in the Mexican economy during the 1990s led to a growth in the labor market for top managers Thus, business restructuring caused by bankruptcy, as well as mergers and acquisitions, privatization and so on, led to the dismissal of business managers who then entered the labor market in large numbers. The increasing presence of these managers in the labor market helped family businesses to recruit well-qualified senior executives.

JETRO and Japan's Postwar Export Promotion System: Messages for Latin American Export Promotion Agencies

This paper tries to explain how the Japanese postwar export promotion system worked and what kind of roles JETRO played in this system. Two case studies of JETRO's successful export promotion activities were also introduced. The paper also points out the themes to be solved by the TPO (Trade Promotion Organizations). Finally the paper shows four advices for Latin American Export Promotion Agencies, based upon JETRO's postwar experiences.

Investment promotion agencies: do they work?

In this paper, we examine the role of investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in promoting outward FDI from Japan and Korea. Looking at two home countries enables us to control for both country-pair time-invariant characteristics and host country time-varying characteristics. Our empirical results suggest that home-country IPAs tend to be more effective in promoting outward FDI in politically risky host countries. However, this finding depends on whether the home-country firm is listed or unlisted. More specifically, we find that the positive effect of home country IPAs on outward FDI in politically risky countries is limited to unlisted home- country firms, which are widely assumed to be less competitive and productive.

Do export promotion agencies increase exports?

In this paper, we examine the role of export promotion agencies (EPAs) in promoting exports from Japan and Korea. Looking at two home countries enables us to tackle endogeneity issues by controlling for both country-pair time-invariant characteristics and importing country time-varying characteristics. Our empirical results indicate that the coefficients of the EPA dummy are similar in size to those of the FTA dummy. This implies that establishing an EPA office in a country is equivalent to signing an FTA with that country. In addition, we find that EPA’s effects are larger for manufactured products than non-manufactured products. Finally, the EPA effect is larger for low income trade partners than for high income trade partners.