Post-1988 civil-military relations in Myanmar

This paper explores the development of civil–military relations in Myanmar since 1988. After the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) took over the state by means of a coup d’état in 1988, the top generals ruled the country without recourse to significant formal political institutions such as a constitution, elections and parliament. A unique authoritarian regime, where political power was predominantly under the military’s influence, lasted for more than 20 years in the country. It seemed to many observers that the military regime was highly durable and that its dictator, General Than Shwe, had no intention of altering the highly repressive character of the political system. However, a new leader, President Thein Sein, who came to power in March 2011, has decided to implement some political and economic reforms that could undermine the Tatmadaw’s dominant role in politics and the economy. This paper examines the background to this sudden political change in Myanmar, focusing on the relationship between its dictator, the military and the state. This paper’s main argument is that Than Shwe has carefully prepared the transition of 2011 as a generational change in the Tatmadaw and in state leadership. The argument is also made that the challenges created by Thein Sein can be understood as a result of his redefinition of national security and balancing of security-centralism with state-led developmentalism.

Gacaca and DDR : the disputable record of state-building in Rwanda

State-building is currently considered to be an indispensable process in overcoming state fragility: a condition characterized by frequent armed conflicts as well as chronic poverty. In this process, both the capacity and the legitimacy of the state are supposed to be enhanced; such balanced development of capacity and legitimacy has also been demanded in security sector reform (SSR), which is regarded as being a crucial part of post-conflict state-building. To enhance legitimacy, the importance of democratic governance is stressed in both state-building and SSR in post-conflict countries. In reality, however, the balanced enhancement of capacity and legitimacy has rarely been realized. In particular, legitimacy enhancement tends to stagnate in countries in which one of multiple warring parties takes a strong grip on state power. This paper tries to understand why such unbalanced development of state-building and SSR has been observed in post-conflict countries, through a case study of Rwanda. Analyses of two policy initiatives in the security sector - Gacaca transitional justice and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) - indicate that although these programs achieved goals set by the government, their contribution to the normative objectives promoted by the international community was quite debatable. It can be understood that this is because the country has subordinated SSR to its state-building process. After the military victory of the former rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the ruling elite prioritized the establishment of political stability over the introduction of international norms such as democratic governance and the rule of law. SSR was implemented only to the extent that it contributed to, and did not threaten, Rwanda's RPF-led state-building.

Changing local elite selection in Thailand : emergence of new local government presidents after direct elections and their capabilities

Before rural local government units were established in Thailand, reform debates within the country faced a crucial issue: Candidates at the rural sub-district levels might adopt electioneering methods such as vote buying and the patronage system of the local political and economic elite, the methods that had been used in the national elections. In fact, the results of the 2006 survey in this paper, which followed the introduction of direct elections in rural local government units in 2003, contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform. The preliminary data of the survey shows that the decentralization process and the introduction of the direct election system in the rural areas had some effect in changing the selection process of the local elite in Thailand.