Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

Food safety control system of Chinese eel exports and its challenges

This paper analyzes factors associated with the rejection of products at ports of importer countries and remedial actions taken by producers in China. As an example, it uses one of the most competitive agro-food products of China: live and processed eels. This paper provides an overview of eel production and trade trends in China. In addition, it identifies the causes of port rejection of Chinese eel products as veterinary drug residues by examining the detailed case studies of export firms and the countermeasures taken by the government and firms.