A Comparative Study of Development Mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan: Introductory Analysis

This article is the introduction to a special issue of The Developing Economies which presented the results of a research project by the Institute of Developing Economies that examined the development mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan. Our conclusion in this article is that their development mechanisms, despite their similar development patterns of export-led industrialization, have been essentially different: a government-led mechanism in Korea as opposed to a market-led mechanism in Taiwan. We verified this difference through comparative studies of the two economies covering trade balances, the growth of total factor productivity, the scale of enterprises and business groups, and the development processes of individual manufacturing sectors. In our explanatory discussion we propose that the difference in the mechanisms is based on: 1) the amount of accumulation in the economy at the time postwar industrialization started, 2) the relationship between government and society, and 3) the mechanism of social network formation.

Political influence in commercial and financial oil trading : the evidence from US firms

International politics affects oil trade. But do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold-up risks, which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to expropriation. In particular, our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from U.S. political enemies. Interestingly, while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics, other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag. Our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets, policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk.

The effects of international politics on oil-exporting developing countries

International politics affects oil trade. But does it affect the oil-exporting developing countries more? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to changes in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To the extent that developing countries have higher hold-up risks because of their weaker institutions, the political effect on oil trade should be more significant in the developing world. We find that oil import decisions are indeed more elastic when firms import from developing countries, although the reverse is true in the short run. Our results suggest that international politics can affect oil revenue and hence long-term development in the developing world.

The Garment Industry in Cambodia: Its Role in Poverty Reduction through Export-Oriented Development

Cambodia's export-oriented garment industry has contributed greatly to poverty reduction in the country through employment of the poor. This paper provides a statistical verification of this contribution based on firm-level data from 164 sampled companies collected in 2003. Its main conclusions confirm the substantial impact that employment in the garment industry has had on poverty reduction in Cambodia. Firstly, entry-level workers receive wages far above the poverty line. Secondly, females make up the predominant share of the main category jobs in the industry. Thirdly, barriers to employment and to promotions up to certain job categories are not high in terms of education and experience. Another important finding is that a typical sample firm exhibited high profitability, although there was wide variation in profitability among firms. This average of high profitability could be a good predictor of Cambodia's viability in the intensified competition since the phase out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) at the beginning of 2005. A point of note is that Cambodia's pattern of industrial development led by a labor-intensive industry is similar to that of neighboring countries in East Asia which earlier went through the initial stage of industrial development, except that Cambodia has lacked a strong government industrial promotion policy which characterized the earlier group.

Development of broiler integration in Peru

Production and consumption of broiler meat has expanded rapidly in Peru since the 1990s. This rapid expansion was possible due to technological changes in production as well as integration of various stages of production, such as breeding farms, hatcheries, feed mills and grow-out farms by so-called broiler integrators. However, there are some distinguishing characteristics in Peruvian broiler integration that differ from those in developed countries. One is the truncated scope of integration, in which the slaughtering and processing stages are not integrated. The other is that not slaughtering and processing companies, but grow-out farms have become the principal broiler integrators. This paper analyzes the factors associated with these characteristics.

Political limits on the world oil trade : firm-level evidence from US firms

International politics affect trade patterns, especially for firms in extractive industries. We construct the firm-level dataset for the U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2010 to test whether the state of international relations with the trading partners of the U.S. affect importing behavior of the U.S. firms. To measure "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners we use voting records for the UN General Assembly. We find that the U.S. firms, in fact, import significantly less oil from the political opponents of the U.S. Our conjecture is that the decrease in oil imports is mainly driven by large, vertically-integrated U.S. firms that engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) overseas.

Why do oil importers diversify their import sources politically? : evidence from U.S. firm-level data

International politics affects oil trade. But why? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine what kinds of firms are more responsive to change in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To test this hold-up risk hypothesis, we investigate heterogeneity in responses by matching transaction-level import data with firm-level worldwide reserves. Our results show that long-run oil import decisions are indeed more elastic for firms with oil reserves overseas than those without, although the reverse is true in the short run. We interpret this empirical regularity as that while firms trade in the spot market can adjust their imports immediately, vertically-integrated firms with investment overseas tend to commit to term contracts in the short run even though they are more responsive to changes in international politics in the long run.