Consensus and democracy in Indonesia : Musyawarah-Mufakat revisited

This paper analyzes customary practices of consensus decision making, called musyawarah-mufakat, as a basis of democratic stability in Indonesia. Musyawarah and mufakat (deliberation and consensus) are a traditional decision-making rule in Indonesia which has often been observed in village meetings. This paper argues that this traditional decision-making rule is still employed even in a modernized and democratized Indonesia, not only at rural assemblies but in the national parliament as well. Furthermore, this consensus way of decision making provides an institutional basis for democratic stability by giving every parliamentary player, whether big or small, an equal opportunity to express his/her interests. On the other hand, this system of musyawarah‐mufakat decreases political efficiency in the sense that it takes a long time to deliberate drafted laws in the parliament.

Constitutional Review and Democratic Consolidation: A Literature Review

This paper reviews the literature on the prevalence of constitutional review across the world, and particularly in emerging democracies, during the last two decades. Two major questions should be addressed in this regard. First, why has the judiciary been empowered and what factors affect judicial activism? Second, does constitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function? In sum, the literature shows that constitutional review can make democracy self-enforcing if there is sufficient competition among political parties or between the legislature and the executive branch of government. In a more sophisticated case, political balance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions.

Increasing popular participation in the treaty-making process : the legislative process of Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution of Thailand

Historically, the authority to conclude international treaties was exclusively exercised by administrative bodies (or the chief of state). However, recent studies pointed out that the present legislative bodies have come to play a more active role through ratification or the review of treaties in European and American countries. Harrington (2005) studied judicial reform in British dominions and criticized the past executive-dominant treaty-making process as a “democratic deficit” due to a fear that under this system the nation might be bound by international agreements for which a consensus had not been obtained. These studies indicated that people’s participation in the treaty-making process has increased on a global basis, but neither of them provides sufficient descriptive evidence regarding why and how such procedures were established. The present paper therefore attempts to solve these questions by analyzing the legislative and political process of the treaty-making procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 constitution as a case study.

Chairship system and decision making by consensus in international agreements : the case of ASEAN

How are different positions reconciled under decision making by consensus in international agreements? This article aims to answer this question. Consensus rule provides each participant a veto, which risks resulting in non-agreement. Taking ASEAN as a case study of international organizations that have adopted consensus rule as the main decision-making procedure, this article presents the chairship system as an analytical scheme to examine how different positions are or are not reconciled under consensus rule. The system is based on conventional knowledge regarding the chair in international conference, which can be defined as an institution where the role of the chair is taken by one member state in an international organization and plays a role in agenda-setting. The agenda-setting power given to the chair varies across organizations. This article assumes that the chair in ASEAN is given a relatively strong agenda-setting power to enable the chair to reach agreements and bias such agreements in its own favor.