Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.

Cost Reduction Effects of "pseudo FTAs" in Asia -Application of a price model based on a multilateral I/O table-

This paper examines the repercussion effects on the production cost of industries in Asian countries when some countries eliminate tariffs and import commodity taxes on all imports. This kind of analysis is related in some sense to that measuring the effects of FTAs on economies, and thus may be considered as an analysis of “pseudo FTAs.” Examining a number of combinations of “pseudo FTAs” between China, Japan, and ASEAN, it is found that the case of China plus Japan plus ASEAN is the most effective “pseudo FTA” of the combinations in terms of production cost reduction. The method is a form of price model based on the Asian International Input-Output Table. Almost no studies on price models related to multilateral I/O tables have been implemented thus far.