Constitutions around the world : A View from Latin America

This paper gives a global summary of the number of constitutions and the number of　articles in each constitution for many representative countries around the world. Several　works have already been written comparing different legal systems and different　constitutional traditions around the world; the purpose of this paper is just to compare the　numbers of constitutions and articles in the diverse regions of the world, namely: North　America, Latin America, Europe, Oceania, Middle East, Asia and Africa. Around the world, on average, Latin America has had the most convoluted constitutional history. The Dominican Republic has had a total of 32 constitutions, the largest number of constitutions of any country, since its independence in 1844. Three other countries have also had 20 or more constitutions throughout their history, all of them in Latin America: Venezuela (26), Haiti (24) and Ecuador (20). On the other hand, there are economies and societies that do not even have codified constitutions, like the United Kingdom in Europe, Hong Kong in Asia and New Zealand in Oceania. The United States has had only one constitution, even if it has been amended several times. There are also the special cases of Israel and Saudi Arabia, both in the Middle East, that do not have official written constitutions for historical and religious reasons. Comparative constitutional numbers and history help explain several things about the stability of political systems, but not necessarily about their quality.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.

Increasing popular participation in the treaty-making process : the legislative process of Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution of Thailand

Historically, the authority to conclude international treaties was exclusively exercised by administrative bodies (or the chief of state). However, recent studies pointed out that the present legislative bodies have come to play a more active role through ratification or the review of treaties in European and American countries. Harrington (2005) studied judicial reform in British dominions and criticized the past executive-dominant treaty-making process as a “democratic deficit” due to a fear that under this system the nation might be bound by international agreements for which a consensus had not been obtained. These studies indicated that people’s participation in the treaty-making process has increased on a global basis, but neither of them provides sufficient descriptive evidence regarding why and how such procedures were established. The present paper therefore attempts to solve these questions by analyzing the legislative and political process of the treaty-making procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 constitution as a case study.