The determinants of rural electrification in Bihar, India

This paper explores intra-state disparity in access to electricity and examines the determinants of electrification at the village level in Bihar, one of the underdeveloped states in India. Our field survey of 80 villages in 5 districts conducted in 2008-09 found that 48 villages (60%) are electrified when using the definition of electrification that a village is electrified if any one household in the village is connected to electricity. The degrees of “electrification” in terms of the proportion of household connection and available hours of electricity remain by and large low, and at the same time differ across districts, villages and seasons. In the processes of electrification, approximately 40% of villages have been electrified in recent years. Based on the basic findings of the survey, this paper examines the electrification processes and how it has changed in recent years. The econometric analyses demonstrate that location is the most important determinant of a village’s electricity connection. Another important finding is that with the rapid progress of rural electrificationunder the recent government programme and the tendency to connect the villages which are easily accessible, the collective bargaining power of the village, which used to significantly affect the process of electrification, has lost influence. This adversely affects remote villages. In order to extend electricity supplies to remote and geographically disadvantaged villages, the government needs to consider seriously other options for sustainable electricity supply, such as decentralized distribution of electricity rather than the conventional connection through the national/local grids.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.