Chapter 5 Industrial Policy, Structure, and Locations during the Transition toward a Market-oriented Economy in Myanmar

This paper examines Myanmar's industrial policy, structure, and locations during the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one throughout the 1990s and up to the present. After the military government assumed power in 1988, it abandoned the socialist centrally planned economic system and began instituting a market-oriented one through a series of liberalization and deregulation measures, although most of which have stalled since 1997 and remain half-way implemented. Against this background, it is rather surprising that the impact of these new policies of international trade, finance, regulations, licensing and ownership requirements on industrial structure and location in Myanmar has been poorly documented and examined to date. Some key issues to understanding the impact and effectiveness of the market-oriented policies during the last two decades in Myanmar remain to be answered: Have the new trade and industrial policies changed the industrial structure and organizational behavior in Myanmar? Have they improved the performance of Myanmar's industrial sector? Have they had any impact on industry location in Myanmar? This paper reviews the series of liberalization programs implemented under the military government?the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)?and assesses their impact on industrial structure and its spatial distribution.

Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.

Gacaca and DDR : the disputable record of state-building in Rwanda

State-building is currently considered to be an indispensable process in overcoming state fragility: a condition characterized by frequent armed conflicts as well as chronic poverty. In this process, both the capacity and the legitimacy of the state are supposed to be enhanced; such balanced development of capacity and legitimacy has also been demanded in security sector reform (SSR), which is regarded as being a crucial part of post-conflict state-building. To enhance legitimacy, the importance of democratic governance is stressed in both state-building and SSR in post-conflict countries. In reality, however, the balanced enhancement of capacity and legitimacy has rarely been realized. In particular, legitimacy enhancement tends to stagnate in countries in which one of multiple warring parties takes a strong grip on state power. This paper tries to understand why such unbalanced development of state-building and SSR has been observed in post-conflict countries, through a case study of Rwanda. Analyses of two policy initiatives in the security sector - Gacaca transitional justice and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) - indicate that although these programs achieved goals set by the government, their contribution to the normative objectives promoted by the international community was quite debatable. It can be understood that this is because the country has subordinated SSR to its state-building process. After the military victory of the former rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the ruling elite prioritized the establishment of political stability over the introduction of international norms such as democratic governance and the rule of law. SSR was implemented only to the extent that it contributed to, and did not threaten, Rwanda's RPF-led state-building.