Does the use of multiple FTAs force firms to raise local input share? : evidence of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon

This paper empirically investigates the firm-level relationship between the local input share and the number of used FTAs by employing the data on FTA utilization in Japanese affiliates in ASEAN. As a result, we do not find a robust linear relationship. However, affiliates using a large number of FTAs (seven or eight) have an extremely higher share of local inputs. This result might be interpreted as the first evidence of the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon”.

Recent trends in Asian integration and Japanese participation

In East Asia, de facto integration is taking place because Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are flourishing in the region. ASEAN aims to form an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 with the completion of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Surrounding countries have been competing with each other to forge FTAs or EPAs with ASEAN, including China, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and India. As a result, ASEAN has become a trading hub in East Asia. Bilateral FTAs/EPAs are also partly in place among 16 countries (ASEAN + 6). These economic ties in trade, services and investment are accelerating this region’s development as the world’s largest production base and biggest consumption market, helping to turn around the global recession in the aftermath of the so-called Lehman Shock. However, some problems also need to be pointed out in the East Asian integration such as the spaghetti bowl effect, severe competition, labor issues, environmental destruction and power struggles.

Impacts of common rules of origin on FTA utilization

This paper examines empirically the impacts of sharing rules of origin (RoOs) with other ASEAN+1 free trade agreements (FTAs) on ASEAN-Korea FTA/ASEAN-China FTA utilization in Thai exports in 2011. Our careful empirical analysis suggests that the harmonization of RoOs across FTAs play some role in reducing the costs yielded through the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. In particular, the harmonization to "change-in-tariff classification (CTC) or real value-added content (RVC)" will play a relatively positive role in not seriously discouraging firms’ use of multiple FTA schemes. On the other hand, the harmonization to CTC or CTC&RVC hinders firms from using those schemes.

Dynamics of investment negotiations between China and Japan : the China-Japan-Korea trilateral investment treaty and beyond

The investment agreement relationship between China and Japan is complex. The many intersecting and overlapping agreements can rightly be described as a "noodle bowl of agreements." The 1989 bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between China and Japan still stands. Japan can also free-ride on the negotiation outcome of China's BITs and free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries by using the most-favored-nation (MFN) provision in the 1989 China-Japan BIT, which does not contain regional economic integration organization (REIO) exception rules. However, because the China-Japan BIT does not have investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), it may face implementation problems. The China-Japan-Korea trilateral investment treaty (CJK TIT), in force since 2014, made improvements upon the 1989 BIT, but Japan is not entirely satisfied with the outcome. For Japan, pre-establishment national treatment (NT) and prohibition of various types of performance requirements are the most important negotiation items, but the CJK TIT insufficiently addressed those problems. Moreover, because the CJK TIT has MFN provisions with an REIO exception rule, better access to investment markets brought about by future FTAs such as the China-Korea FTA and the EU-China FTA cannot be imported into CJK TIT. Hence, in the long run, Japan needs to pursue an FTA investment chapter with China that covers both MFN and ISDS.