The asset/liability structure of the Philippine banks and non-bank financial institutions in 2000s : a preliminary study for financial access analyses

Based on the consolidated statements data of the universal/commercial banks (UKbank) and non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking licenses, this paper presents a keen necessity of obtaining data in detail on both sides (assets and liabilities) of their financial conditions and further analyses. Those would bring more adequate assessments on the Philippine financial system, especially with regard to each financial subsector's financing/lending preferences and behavior. The paper also presents a possibility that the skewed locational and operational distribution exists in the non-UKbank financial subsectors. It suggests there may be a significant deviation from the authorities' (the BSP, SEC and others) intended/anticipated financial system in the banking/non-bank financial institutions' real operations.

Bank restructuring and financial institution reform in Indonesia

The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructuring, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and ownership changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The central bank's supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks, and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.

Transformation of the Financial Sector in Indonesia

Introduction : The source and deployment of finance are central issues in economic development. Since 1966, when the Soeharto Administration was inaugurated, Indonesian economic development has relied on funds in the form of aid from international organizations and foreign countries. After the 1990s, a further abundant inflow of capital sustained a rapid economic development. Foreign funding was the basis of Indonesian economic growth. This paper will describe the mechanism for allocating funds in the Indonesian economy. It will identify the problems this mechanism generated in the Indonesian experience, and it will attempt to explain why there was a collapse of the financial system in the wake of the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. History of the Indonesian Financial system The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It can be said that before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact commonly attributed to economic disruptions like the consecutive runs of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the Soekarno Administration. After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory system of financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, was introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis of the current financial system in Indonesia was built up. 　　　The Indonesian financial structure was significantly altered at the first financial reform of 1983. Between 1966 and 1982, the banking sector consisted of Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) and the state-owned banks. There was also a system for distributing the abundant public revenue derived from the soaring oil price of the 1970s. The public finance distribution function, incorporated in Indonesian financial system, changed after the successive financial reforms of 1983 and 1988, when there was a move away from the monopoly-market style dominated by state-owned banks (which was a system of public finance distribution that operated at the discretion of the government) towards a modern market mechanism. The five phases of development The Indonesian financial system developed in five phases between 1966 and the present time. The first period (1966-72) was its formative period, the second (1973-82) its policy based finance period under soaring oil prices, the third (1983-91) its financial-reform period, the fourth (1992-97) its period of expansion, and the fifth (1998-) its period of financial restructuring. The first section of this paper summarizes the financial policies operative during each of the periods identified above. In the second section changes to the financial sector in response to policies are examined, and an analysis of these changes shows that an important development of the financial sector occurred during the financial reform period. In the third section the focus of analysis shifts from the general financial sector to particular commercial banks’ performances. In the third section changes in commercial banks’ lending and fund-raising behaviour after the 1990s are analysed by comparing several banking groups in terms of their ownership and foundation time. The last section summarizes the foregoing analyses and examines the problems that remain in the Indonesian financial sector, which is still undergoing restructuring.

Inflation targeting in Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines : the impact on business cycle synchronization between each country and the world

This paper empirically analyzes whether and to what extent the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) in Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines has affected their business cycle synchronization with the rest of the world. By employing the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model developed by Engle (2002), we find that IT in Asia has little effect on international business cycle synchronization and the effect is positive in some of the countries, if any. These findings basically seem to be consistent with the evidence from relevant literature.

Measuring global value chains and regional economic integration : an international input-output approach

Firms that are expanding their cross-border activities, such as vertical specialization trade, outsourcing, and fragmentation productions, have brought dramatic changes to the global economy during the last two decades. In an attempt to understand the evolution of the interaction among countries or country groups, many trade-statistics-based indicators have been developed. However, most of these statistics focus on showing the direct trade-specific-relationship among countries, rather than considering the roles that intercountry and interindustrial production networks play in a global economy. This paper uses the concepts of trade in value added as measured by the input–output tables of OECD and IDE-JETRO to provide alternative indicators that show the evolution of regional economic integration and global value chains for more than 50 economies. In addition, this paper provides thoughts on how to evaluate comparative advantages on the basis of value added using an international input–output model.

Domestic and international border effects

Previous studies in the border-effect literature surprisingly found that domestic border effects are larger than international border effects (e.g., in the United States or Brazil). One interpretation of this result is that these estimates include the effects of producer agglomeration. Therefore, in this study, we estimate those border effects exclusively for transactions for final consumption, in which such agglomeration forces will be weak, in China and Japan. As a result, we found larger international border effects and could not find a significant role for producer agglomeration in the estimates of border effects. We also found that China's accession to the World Trade Organization reduces border effects in trading between China and Japan but does not decrease domestic border effects.

Excess capital and bank behavior : evidence from Indonesia

The Indonesian banking sector has been restructured since Asian financial crisis and restored to soundness. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) returned to a sound level; however, the average excess capital has become too high, while credit disbursement has remained low. This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian banks and its effects on credit growth during the 2000s. The results indicate that the determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. Return on equity (ROE) affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks, and the effect of non-performing loans is mixed, differing for various bank types. Excess capital affects credit growth positively, except among foreign banks.