Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Backward-bending of labor supply function and free riders

It seems like that backward- bending of labor supply function can be observed in Central Asian Countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. People’s basic needs of life are satisfied and they do not increase labor supplies even if wage increases. It is possible to find some cases in which slowdowns increase, when a manager in a firm enforces penalties for workers have slowdowns. This phenomenon occurs because a worker prefers the position of equilibrium on the labor supply function always in the upper direction. This article explains the increase of free-riders by penalties and how to avoid them.