Trade Credits under Imperfect Enforcement: A Theory with a Test on Chinese Experience

It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sector’s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.

Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

The location of manufacturing firms and imperfect information in transport market

It is well know that transport charges are not symmetric: fronthaul and backhaul costs on a route may differ, because they are affected by the distribution of economic acitivities. This paper develops a two-regional general equilibrium model in which transport costs are determined endogenously as a result of a search and matching process. It is shown that economies or diseconomies of transport density emerge, depending on the search costs of transport firms and the relative importance of the possibility of backhaul transportation. It is found that the symmetry of the distribution of economic activity may break owing to economies of transport density when the additional search costs are small enough.

The Degree of Competition in the Thai Banking Industry before and after the East Asian Crisis

This paper analyzes the influence of the East Asian crisis and the subsequent reforms on the oligopolistic nature of the Thai banking industry. Since the crisis, there have been substantial changes in competitive environment, including a decline in the family ownership of banks as well as the arrival of new entrants. How did these changes affect a banking industry in which the six largest local banks accounted for over 70 percent of market share? The estimated Lerner index from Bresnahan's [1989] conjectural variation model indicates the possibility of a decline in the degree of competition.

Winner-Take-All Contention of Innovation under Globalization: A Simulation Analysis and East Asia's Empirics

This paper sets out to examine how innovation enhances export competitiveness: The proposition that export volume becomes enhanced as more productivity-enhancing innovation is captured by the exporting economy is the focus of this study. From a Schumpeterian perspective, innovation can be characterized by continuous creation and subsequent diffusion of newer technologies on the basis of the exporters' existing capital stock. Then we highlight the theoretical possibility that concentration of innovative activities in a small group of "winner" economies would lead to larger shares of "winner" economies' exports of innovation-active commodities than those commodities for which technology involved is already mature. The world's export data corroborates this theoretical prediction overall, and a focus upon East Asia has revealed the region's increasing resort to technology-intensive commodity sectors, which has presumably been enabled through attracting technology-bearing inward foreign direct investment. Considering the overall gains from innovation, acceleration of full "cycle" of innovation and imitation might be a desirable option.

Frontiers of the New Economic Geography

This paper presents an overview of recent development in the new economic geography (NEG), and discusses possible directions of its future development. Since there already exist several surveys on this topic, we focus on the selected features of the NEG which are important yet have attracted insufficient attention, and also on the recent refinements and extensions of the framework.

On the Evolution of the Spatial Economy with Multi-unit/Multi-plant Firms: The Impact of IT Development

This paper examines how the decline of communication costs between management and production facilities within firms and the decrease in trade costs of manufactured goods affect the spatial organization of a two-region economy with multi-unit/multi-plant firms. The development of information technology decreases the costs of communication and trade costs. Thus, the fragmentation of firms is promoted. Our result indicates that, with decreasing communication costs, firms producing low trade-cost products (such as consumer electronics) tend to concentrate their manufacturing plants in low wage countries. In contrast, firms producing high trade-cost products (such as automobiles) tend to have multiple plants serving to segmented markets, even in the absence of wage differentials.

Globalization and the Evolution of the Supply Chain: who gains and who loses?

This paper focuses on two distinct facets of globalization: the decrease in the trade costs of goods and the decline of communication costs between headquarters and production facilities within firms. When the unskilled have about the same wage in the two regions, the decrease of these costs fosters the gradual agglomeration of plants in the core region accommodating the headquarters. By contrast, when the wage gap is significant, the process of integration eventually triggers the re-location of plants into the periphery. In particular, when the process of re-location is driven by falling communication costs, the welfare of all workers living in the core goes down whereas the welfare of those who reside in the periphery rises.

Economies of Transport Density and Industrial Agglomeration

This paper develops a model of a spatial economy in which interregional trade patterns and the structure of the transport network are determined endogenously as a result of the interaction between industrial location behavior and increasing returns in transportation, in particular, economies of transport density. The traditional models assume either the structure of the transport network or industrial location patterns, and hence, they are unable to explain the interdependence of the two. It is shown that economies of transport density can be the primary source of industrial localization.

Political conditions for fair elections

Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

Perfecting the Catching-up: The Case of Taiwan's Motorcycle Industry

The final stage of the catching-up process has formidable hurdles. This paper examines the case of Taiwan’s motorcycle industry and shows how latecomers overcame the hurdles. In the early 1990s, the two largest motorcycle makers in Taiwan, Sanyang and Kwang Yang, had completed the catching-up process and became independent from Honda, on which they had technologically depended since the early 1960s. The requisite for independence was acquiring the capacity for product innovation. The two assemblers could cultivate technological capacity by investing abundant resources, which they accumulated in the protected market. It should be noted that although the market was protected and highly concentrated, it was also very competitive. Another condition was the solid local suppliers of parts and components. The local suppliers had also grown under the government’s industrial policies. However, their development beyond imitators can be attributed to their own initiatives.

Trade Coefficients and the Role of Elasticity in a Spatial CGE Model Based on the Armington Assumption

The Armington Assumption in the context of multi-regional CGE models is commonly interpreted as follows: Same commodities with different origins are imperfect substitutes for each other. In this paper, a static spatial CGE model that is compatible with this assumption and explicitly considers the transport sector and regional price differentials is formulated. Trade coefficients, which are derived endogenously from the optimization behaviors of firms and households, are shown to take the form of a potential function. To investigate how the elasticity of substitutions affects equilibrium solutions, a simpler version of the model that incorporates three regions and two sectors (besides the transport sector) is introduced. Results indicate: (1) if commodities produced in different regions are perfect substitutes, regional economies will be either autarkic or completely symmetric and (2) if they are imperfect substitutes, the impact of elasticity on the price equilibrium system as well as trade coefficients will be nonlinear and sometimes very sensitive.

Market Access and Intermediate Goods Trade

The role of importer access to the finished goods market in intermediate goods trade is examined by estimating the gravity-like equation derived from the NEG model. Importer access to demand for finished goods is calculated by using the estimates in the gravity equation for finished goods trade, and then intermediate goods trade is regressed on the importer access. Results indicate that imports of intermediate goods are sensitive not only to the magnitude of importer demand for finished goods but also to the demand of neighboring countries. Using results of the regression, the impact of US finished goods market expansion on intermediate goods trade in each country is simulated.

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

Chapter 1 Market Access and Intermediate Goods Trade

This paper examines a distinctive feature of intermediate goods trade which the traditional gravity equation fails to capture, i.e., intermediate goods trade is positively related not only to the importing country's demand for finished goods but also to its neighbors' demand for finished goods. We regress a gravity equation for finished goods trade in the first step. Then, introducing the importing country's access to the total demand for finished goods which is calculated by using the estimates in the first step, we regress our gravity equation for trade in intermediate goods. Our regression results confirm such a feature of intermediate goods trade. Using the results of the regression, we simulate how the rise of US consumers' demand for finished goods affects the total imports and exports of intermediate goods in each country.