On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.

International labor migration in Vietnam and the impact of receiving countries' policies

Labor export has been part of Vietnam’s socio-economic development strategy since the beginning of the doi moi era. Recent years, Vietnam has sent about 80,000 workers abroad per year. Vietnam has become a major source country of unskilled foreign workers for high-income East Asian countries. However, in these receiving countries, the desertion rate among Vietnamese workers is quite high, compared with that for workers from other countries. This paper examines the impact of Korean and Japanese policies for receiving foreign workers applied to and implemented in Vietnam, as well as the impact of Vietnamese labor sending system, on the problem of runaway workers.