The Degree of Competition in the Thai Banking Industry before and after the East Asian Crisis

This paper analyzes the influence of the East Asian crisis and the subsequent reforms on the oligopolistic nature of the Thai banking industry. Since the crisis, there have been substantial changes in competitive environment, including a decline in the family ownership of banks as well as the arrival of new entrants. How did these changes affect a banking industry in which the six largest local banks accounted for over 70 percent of market share? The estimated Lerner index from Bresnahan's [1989] conjectural variation model indicates the possibility of a decline in the degree of competition.

「華南銀行」の迷走と変容 -- 金融的「南進」の理想と現実 -- 1919~1945

本稿は，1919 年に日本植民地下の台北で，大正期における南進の理想を金融的に具現化するべく，日本と華僑の合弁によって創設された「華南銀行」の経営を考察する。そこからは大正から昭和において，ほぼ一貫して「南進」という文脈のなかで活動した特徴ある日系金融機関でありながらも，経済環境の悪化だけでなく，設立時からの構造的問題やずさんな経営内容によって長期間の迷走を続け，変容していった様相が浮かび上がる。具体的には，(1) 1919年の創設から数年の拡張期，(2) 経営不調から1924年と1927年に実施された第一次・第二次整理の内容，(3) 1920年代末から南洋邦人事業向け融資に深入りする背景と顛末，(4) 1930年代の第三次整理案が錯綜して迷走を続けたまま1940年代の終焉に向かった姿，などをたどる。

Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.