Establishing electoral administration systems in new democracies

The difficulty of holding fair elections continues to be a critical problem in many newly democratized countries. The core of the problem is the electoral administration's lack of political autonomy and capability to regulate fraud. This paper seeks to identify the conditions for establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration system. An electoral administration system has two main functions: to disclose the nature of elections and to prevent fraud. We argue in this paper that an autonomous and capable electoral administration system exists if the major political players have the incentive to disclose the information on the elections and to secure the ruler's credible commitment to fair elections. We examine this argument through comparative case studies of Korea and the Philippines. Despite similar historical and institutional settings, their election commissions exhibit contrasting features. The difference in the incentive structures of the major political players seems to have caused the divergence in the institutional evolution of the election commissions in the two countries.

A Comparative Study of Development Mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan: Introductory Analysis

This article is the introduction to a special issue of The Developing Economies which presented the results of a research project by the Institute of Developing Economies that examined the development mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan. Our conclusion in this article is that their development mechanisms, despite their similar development patterns of export-led industrialization, have been essentially different: a government-led mechanism in Korea as opposed to a market-led mechanism in Taiwan. We verified this difference through comparative studies of the two economies covering trade balances, the growth of total factor productivity, the scale of enterprises and business groups, and the development processes of individual manufacturing sectors. In our explanatory discussion we propose that the difference in the mechanisms is based on: 1) the amount of accumulation in the economy at the time postwar industrialization started, 2) the relationship between government and society, and 3) the mechanism of social network formation.

Skill distribution and comparative advantage: a comparison of China and India

This paper empirically examines the different comparative advantages of two emerging economic giants, China and India, in relation to the different skill distribution patterns in each country. By utilizing industry export data on China and India from 1983 to 2000, we find that a country with a greater dispersion of skills (i.e., India, especially in the earlier years) has higher exports in industries with shorter production chains, whereas a country with a more equal dispersion of skills (i.e., China, especially in the later years) is found to have higher exports in industries with longer production chains. The causal relationship is fairly robust across different specifications. This empirical evidence supports our assumption that the likely mechanism for these results is the negative impact of low-skilled workers on input quality, which accumulates and becomes larger as the length of production chains and the proportion of low-skilled workers in the economy increase.