Industrial Policy in Asia

This paper examines three types of industrialization that have occurred in East Asia: the Japanese, Chinese and generic Asian models. Industrial policies in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) initially protected local companies from foreign investors by imposing high tariffs on foreign investors. But Japan began introducing liberalization policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1960s, and the ROK began to welcome foreign technology in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the governments of the ASEAN countries and Taiwan established export-processing zones (EPZ) to invite FDI by offering preferential treatment, such as tax deductions and exemptions. China adopted similar industrial policies and also established EPZs, attracting the capital and know-how of multinationals and thereby strengthening the international competitiveness of local enterprises. This paper reaches the following three conclusions. First, it would have been difficult for East Asian countries to grow without FDI. Second, central governments were a crucial factor in these countries' growth strategies. Third, EPZs offering preferential treatment can effectively enhance aggregate growth in developing countries, and the Asian experience shows that this strategy can be applied to other countries that satisfy certain preconditions.

Perfecting the Catching-up: The Case of Taiwan's Motorcycle Industry

The final stage of the catching-up process has formidable hurdles. This paper examines the case of Taiwan’s motorcycle industry and shows how latecomers overcame the hurdles. In the early 1990s, the two largest motorcycle makers in Taiwan, Sanyang and Kwang Yang, had completed the catching-up process and became independent from Honda, on which they had technologically depended since the early 1960s. The requisite for independence was acquiring the capacity for product innovation. The two assemblers could cultivate technological capacity by investing abundant resources, which they accumulated in the protected market. It should be noted that although the market was protected and highly concentrated, it was also very competitive. Another condition was the solid local suppliers of parts and components. The local suppliers had also grown under the government’s industrial policies. However, their development beyond imitators can be attributed to their own initiatives.

The Experience of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) : Political Parties in Kenya from 1991 to 2007

This paper first examines splits and mergers among Kenya’s political parties (and inner-party factions) from the restoration of a multi-party system in 1991 until 2007, before the turbulent 10th general elections were conducted. It then considers what functions “political parties” have in Kenya with special reference to the period since 2002, the year in which President Moi announced his intention to retire. A look back at NARC’s five years of rule reveals that, although it succeeded in changing the government, NARC, as a “political party,” remained throughout an organization without any real substance. The paper looks at (1) NARC’s de facto split after its overwhelming win in the ninth general election, (2) malfunctions of the anti-defection laws that were introduced in the 1960s, and (3) Kenya’s election rules that require candidates to be nominated by registered political parties in general elections. The paper proceeds to argue that as a result of the operation of these three elements, Kenya’s political parties, and especially the victorious coalition sides, tend to end up being nothing more than temporary vehicles for political elites angling for post-election posts.

Political economy of low sulfurization and air pollution control policy in Japan : SOx emission reduction by fuel conversion

In the early stages of the development of Japan’s environmental policy, sulfur oxide (SOx) emissions, which seriously damage health, was the most important air pollution problem. In the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the measures against SOx emissions progressed quickly, and these emissions were reduced drastically. The most important factor of the reduction was the conversion to a low-sulfur fuel for large-scale fuel users, such as the electric power industry. However, industries started conversion to low-sulfur fuel not due to environmental concerns, but simply to reduce costs. Furthermore, the interaction among the various interests of the electric power industry, oil refineries, the central government, local governments, and citizens over the energy and environmental policies led to the measures against SOx emissions by fuel conversion.

Rethinking special and differential treatment in the WTO

Special and differential treatment (S&D) allows differentiated treatment for developing countries within the WTO system by justifying a deviation from the most-favoured-nation obligation. Since it was incorporated into the GATT (the predecessor of the WTO) in the 1960s, S&D has played a significant role in promoting the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. However, S&D is undergoing complicated and entangled discussion at the current multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda. There are a number of reasons to make opposing arguments in developed and developing countries, among which this paper focuses on two elements: diversification of developing countries and instability of preferential schemes. In order to overcome these problems and in order to make S&D more effective and operational, this paper considers the following alternative approaches: differentiation among developing countries applying the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) principle by analogy and codification of a preferential scheme as a multilateral agreement in the manner of North-South RTAs with flexibility.