Is It Worthwhile for Indonesia to Rush into a Free Trade Deal with Japan?

This report represents a preliminary attempt to refine some basic ideas on the potential impact Indonesia might experience from a free trade arrangement with Japan, using a forward-looking, multi-regional, multi-sectoral applied general equilibrium model of global trade to capture growth effects through capital accumulation paying attention to the changes in the patterns of interregional capital flows that might happen even before the policy change occurs. The simulation results revealed that the welfare gains of rushing into trade liberalization with Japan are not so large. This makes out that taking time over negotiations might be the best choice for Indonesia if the government places priority on convincing the Indonesian people that a free trade deal with Japan will definitely bring positive effects, while proceeding rapidly might be the answer if the country is serious about recovering the welfare levels that might be lowered by free trade arrangements among Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan.

Firm dynamics in the Cambodian garment industry: firm turnover, productivity growth, and wage profile under trade liberalization

The international garment trade was liberalized in 2005 following the termination of the MFA (Multifibre Arrangement) and ever since then, price competition has intensified. Employing a unique firm dataset collected by the authors, this paper examines the changes in the performance of Cambodian garment firms between 2002/03 and 2008/09. During the period concerned, frequent firm turnover led to an improvement of the industry’s productivity, and the study found that the average total-factor productivity (TFP) of new entrants was substantially higher than that of exiting firms. Furthermore, we observed that thanks to productivity growth, an improvement in workers’ welfare, including a rise in the relative wages of the low-skilled, was taking place. These industrial dynamics differ considerably from those indicated by the “race to the bottom” argument as applied to labor-intensive industrialization in low income countries.

Myopic or farsighted : bilateral trade agreements among three symmetric countries

We examine network formation via bilateral trade agreement (BTA) among three symmetric countries. Each government decides whether to form a link or not via a BTA depending on the differential of ex-post and ex-ante sum of real wages in the country. We model the governmental decision in two forms, myopic and farsighted and analyze the effects on the BTA network formation. First, we find that both myopic and farsighted games never induce the formation of star networks nor empty networks. Second, the networks resulting from myopic game coincides with those resulting from farsighted games.