Negative skill sorting across production chains

Previous literature generally predicts that individuals with higher skills work in industries with longer production chains. However, the opposite skill-sorting pattern, a "negative skill-sorting" phenomenon, is also observed in reality. This paper proposes a possible mechanism by which both cases can happen and shows that negative skill sorting is more likely to occur when the quality of intermediate inputs degrade rapidly (or improves slowly) along the production chain. We empirically confirm our theoretical prediction by using country-industry panel data. The results are robust regardless of estimation method, control variables, and industry coverage. This study has important implications for understanding countries' comparative advantages and development patterns.

Temporary jobs and globalization

Deregulation of the use of temporary workers in 2004 (the Worker Dispatching Act of 2004) has been regarded as an important reason for the recent rise of temporary workers in Japan. However, the shift from permanent to temporary workers began long before. This paper empirically explores links between the shift from permanent to temporary workers in the Japanese manufacturing sector and economic globalization, using industry-level data. We find that outsourcing is positively correlated with the replacement of permanent workers with temporary workers in domestic production. In addition, we find that industries losing world share of value added tend to decrease the employment of permanent workers. Industries with higher exports or imports are aggressive in using temporary workers, which suggests the role of temporary workers as an employment buffer.

Heterogenous match efficiency

In this paper, we show a model with one-sided endogenous match efficiency. It is assumed that schooling can enhance match efficiency, and people will choose the schooling level optimally to balance its costs and benefits of enhanced match efficiency. Assuming a financial market imperfection which limits individuals to borrow, we showed that, in equilibrium, when educational achievements can be characterised by dicohotomy (secondary vs. tertiary), tertiary education gives higher wages even it only has pure match efficiency (signalling) value with no human capital value. We also showed that relative match efficiency vis-a-vis its mean matters in wage levels.