The middle-income trap from the viewpoint of trade structures

In this study, we try to elucidate the middle-income trap from the viewpoint of international trade. We conduct regression analyses on the relationship between income level and net export ratios for different types of goods for trapped and non-trapped samples separately. Our findings indicate that industrial upgrading appears to occur exactly as depicted by the flying-geese model for non-trapped countries while trapped countries tend to depend on the export of primary commodities, and industrialization appears to be driven by forward linkages to processed goods and a narrow base. The results of our analyses suggest that the middle-income trap is a form of Dutch disease or a 'resource curse' in the middle-income stage.

Simulation analysis of the EU ELV/RoHS directives based on an applied general equilibrium model with Melitz-type trade specification

This paper explores the potential usefulness of an AGE model with the Melitz-type trade specification to assess economic effects of technical regulations, taking the case of the EU ELV/RoHS directives as an example. Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings results that exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and electronic equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions/countries expand while the domestic trade in the EU shrinks when the importer's preference for variety (PfV) is not strong; (2) if the PfV is not strong, policy changes that may bring reduction in the number of firms enable survived producers with high productivity to expand production to be large-scale mass producers fully enjoying the fruit of economies of scale; and (3) When the strength of the importer's PfV is changed from zero to unity, there is the value that totally changes simulation results and their interpretations.

Labor clauses in regional trade agreements and effects on labor conditions : an empirical analysis

An increasing number of bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements (or regional trade agreements: RTAs) include "labor clauses" that require or urge the signatory countries to commit to maintaining a certain level of labor standards. This paper performs an empirical analysis of the impacts of such labor clauses provided in RTAs on working conditions that laborers in the RTA signatory countries actually face, using macro-level data for a wide variety of countries. The paper first examines the texts of labor provisions in more than 220 effective RTAs and (re-)classifies "RTAs with labor clauses" according to two criteria: (i) the agreement urges or expects the signatory countries to harmonize their domestic labor standards with internationally recognized standards, and (ii) the agreement stipulates the procedures for consultations and/or dispute settlement on labor-condition issues between the signatory countries. Based on this labor-clause RTA classification, the paper estimates the impacts of RTA labor clauses on working conditions in countries with two empirical specifications using the sample covering 136 countries or economies and years from 1995 through 2011. The estimation is extended to takes into account possible lags in the labor-condition effects of labor clauses as well as to consider potential difference in the impacts for countries in different income levels. The empirical results for the four measures of labor conditions (mean monthly real earnings, mean weekly work hours per employee, fatal occupational injury rate, and the number of the ILO's Core Conventions ratified) find no evidence for possible pro-labor-condition effects of RTA labor clauses overall, which should be consistent with the view of economics literature that questions the relevance of linking trade policy with issues in the domestic labor standards.

Preferential trade agreements and antidumping actions against members and nonmembers

In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes a country's decisions concerning antidumping (AD) action against two foreign countries and the relationship between those decisions and regional trade agreements (RTAs). An RTA intensifies product-market competition in the markets of member countries and lowers product prices, while it raises export prices of goods subject to tariff reductions. This effect widens the dumping margin of the non-member firm and narrows the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government is more concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the member's AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently high value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against the member. If the governments' weight on the domestic firm's profit is neither high nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions against both countries.

Firm-level trade creation and diversion of regional trade agreements in Thailand

Using highly detailed import data for Thailand, this paper examines firm-level trade creation and diversion of regional trade agreements (RTAs). Specifically, by focusing on firm-product pairs in which firms import a particular product from non-members but not from RTA members in the initial year of our sample, we empirically investigate the start of imports from RTA members under RTA schemes and the cessation of imports from non-members at the firm-level. We find that firms are more likely to stop importing products with low RTA tariff rates or high most-favored-nation tariff rates from non-members and to start importing such products from RTA member countries. However, from the quantitative point of view, there are very few firms that switch import sources from non-members to RTA members when facing the introduction of RTA schemes.